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 1. Introduction
 W HY DO PEOPLE save? J. Maynard
 Keynes (1936) lists eight motives
 which we reproduce here with one addi-
 tion:1
 1. "To build up a reserve against un-
 foreseen contingencies" (the pre-
 cautionary motive);
 2. "To provide for an anticipated fu-
 ture relationship between the in-
 come and the needs of the individ-
 ual . . ." (the life-cycle motive);
 3. "To enjoy interest and apprecia-
 tion . . ." (the intertemporal substi-
 tution motive);
 4. "To enjoy a gradually increasing ex-
 penditure . . ." (the improvement
 motive);
 5. "To enjoy a sense of independence
 and the power to do things, though
 without a clear idea or definite in-
 tention of specific action" (the inde-
 pendence motive);
 6. "To secure a masse de manoeuvre to
 carry out speculative or business
 projects" (the enterprise motive);
 7. "To bequeath a fortune" (the be-
 quest motive);
 8. "To satisfy pure miserliness, i.e., un-
 reasonable but insistent inhibitions
 against acts of expenditure as such"
 (the avarice motive);
 9. To accumulate deposits to buy
 houses, cars, and other durables
 (the downpayment motive).
 A number of features of this list bear re-
 mark. First, it seems complete. Inter-
 preting the motives broadly, it seems
 that since 1936 only the downpayment
 motive has been added to the list. Sec-
 ond, there is recognition here of consid-
 erable heterogeneity in the motives for
 saving. It is unlikely that a single expla-
 nation will suffice for all members of a
 population at any given time or even for
 the same person over a long stretch of
 time. In particular, there is a widespread
 feeling that the wealthy have different
 motives to save from the less wealthy.
 1 The designations in italics are our titles but
 they almost a ways follow Keynes.
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 Third, many of the motives are comple-
 mentary. For example, households that
 save for retirement (the life-cycle mo-
 tive) will also build up financial reserves
 that can be used to buffer pre-retire-
 ment income or consumption shocks (the
 precautionary motive). Finally, there are
 some motives that will lead to behavior
 that will be difficult to rationalize with
 traditional economic models. For exam-
 ple, the motives of avarice (or its oppo-
 site, extravagance) and independence
 lend themselves more to psychological
 explanation.
 As promised in the title of this survey
 we shall present theory and facts con-
 cerning saving. At the outset we warn
 that there is a sharp dichotomy in the
 saving literature between the two. Al-
 though the theory is sophisticated and
 flexible, it is a theory of consumption;
 saving is simply the residual between in-
 come and current consumption. Thus the
 intertemporal allocation theory has led
 to a large empirical literature on con-
 sumption. In contrast, most of the em-
 pirical work on saving itself is descriptive
 and relatively atheoretical. Unfortu-
 nately the two strands of the literature
 are very imperfectly interwoven. The
 major goal of future work will be to inte-
 grate these two strands.
 In' Section 2 we present some of the
 modern theory. An extensive theory sec-
 tion is necessary because the past decade
 has seen theoretical developments which
 have changed radically our intuitions
 about consumption and saving behavior.
 One seemingly trivial problem we have
 encountered in discussing the theory is
 that of terminology. As an example, for
 many researchers the term "life-cycle
 model" refers specifically to a Modigliani
 style model with no bequests and fairly
 simple environments. For others the
 term is taken to refer to any model in
 which agents solve forward looking in-
 tertemporal consumption problems that
 may allow for, say, bequests, habits, and
 liquidity constraints. Similar ambiguity
 attaches to the term "permanent income
 hypothesis" which is usually (but not in-
 variably) attached to a model that is dif-
 ferent from that of Milton Friedman
 (1957). Rather than further muddying
 the waters we shall avoid the terms "life-
 cycle model" and "permanent income
 model" as far as possible and refer in-
 stead to models that assume optimization
 as standard (consumption or saving)
 models.2 Within this we discuss various
 important specific cases. The other the-
 ory section is Section 7 in which we pre-
 sent an outline of behavioral models of
 saving that largely eschew the standard
 optimizing framework.
 The principal innovation in the stan-
 dard theory in the past decade has been
 to allow for the precautionary motive. Al-
 though this was discussed in earlier pa-
 pers it is only recently that we have
 come to realize that intuitions derived
 from models without a precautionary
 motive can be seriously misleading, even
 if the amount of uncertainty is small.
 Thus it is often claimed, for example,
 that the life-cycle model implies that the
 path of consumption over the life cycle
 should be independent of the path of in-
 come. This is a prediction of what we
 term the certainty-equivalence model
 (CEQ model, see Section 2.1 for a defi-
 nition) but it is by no means an implica-
 tion of more general models that allow
 for a precautionary motive. The move to
 a more general model that allows explic-
 itly for a precautionary motive brings
 with it both benefits and costs. We shall
 deal with these at length in Section 2 but
 the principal benefit is that we can ac-
 commodate a much wider range of be-
 havior in the precautionary model. One
 2 Even this is contentious; some researchers
 have used the term "standard" to refer to, for ex-
 ample, the Modigliani model or the permanent in-
 come model.
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 of the costs is simply the converse of
 this: we have far less sharp predictions
 from the more general model. The other
 principal cost is in tractability: almost al-
 ways, we are unable to derive closed
 form expressions for saving and con-
 sumption functions and we cannot repro-
 duce many of the manipulations that are
 possible on the CEQ model.
 After the theory section we present
 some facts (Section 3) concerning saving
 by U.S. households. Section 4 deals with
 one specific phenomenon: the apparent
 decline in the U.S. saving rate in the re-
 cent past. In this section we also discuss
 some of the possible explanations for the
 decline in an ad hoc way. This ad hocery
 is imposed on us by the relative igno-
 rance that still surrounds the reasons
 why households save. Many attempts
 have been made to dispel this ignorance.
 In Sections 5 and 6 we consider some of
 the evidence for and against various
 theories of consumption. Section 5 con-
 centrates on the short-run allocation of
 funds over time (particularly Euler equa-
 tion studies of consumption) while Sec-
 tion 6 is concerned with the longer
 run.
 We shall not be dealing with a number
 of topics that readers might expect to see
 treated in a survey on saving (see
 Mervyn King, 1985, and Angus Deaton,
 1992, for excellent surveys of saving be-
 havior). We ignore almost entirely the
 voluminous literature that uses aggregate
 time series data. Although the profession
 has learnt a great deal about the model-
 ing of intertemporal allocation from em-
 pirical work on aggregate time series
 data it is our belief that we have learned
 almost nothing useful about individual
 behavior itself from this work. We also
 restrict attention mainly (but not exclu-
 sively) to U.S. data. Thus we do not have
 much discussion of international com-
 parisons. This is not because we do not
 think that such comparisons are useful
 but simply because we must draw the
 line somewhere; this survey is already
 very long. Interested readers are re-
 ferred to the volume edited by James Po-
 terba (1994) that compares saving rates
 in the G7 countries. Another important
 topic that we largely ignore is intergen-
 erational transfer behavior generally and
 bequest behavior in particular; see Gale
 and John Karl Scholz (1994a) for a dis-
 cussion and references. We also have
 very little to say about portfolio choice;
 this is largely because there is relatively
 little work on this that uses micro data
 directly. Closely related to this is the ac-
 cumulation of assets for households by
 firms (in the form of retained earnings)
 and government (in the form of pen-
 sions); we shall not treat the determina-
 tion of these assets directly although we
 do allow for the impact of their accumu-
 lation in the determination of household
 saving. We shall not, however, review in
 any detail the very large literature on the
 effects of pensions on household saving;
 see Gale (1995) for a recent discussion
 and references.
 2. Models of Saving and Consumption
 2.1 The Certainty-Equivalence Model
 The usual model for discussing the in-
 tertemporal allocation of money and
 time is the life-cycle model. This takes
 its inspiration from Franco Modigliani
 and Richard Brumberg (1954), and
 Friedman (1957)3 but in its modern form
 it is a good deal more general than either
 of the two variants these authors present.
 The central tenet of the modern view is
 that agents attempt to keep the marginal
 utility of expenditure constant over time.
 We refer to this as the standard con-
 sumption model (or standard model, for
 3 See Thomas Mayer (1972) for an excellent dis-
 cussion of the antecedents of the "new" theories of
 consumption that arose in the mid-50s.
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 short). A formal derivation is given be-
 low but the entirely plausible informal
 argument is that rational forward looking
 agents will not want expenditure to be
 worth more (in discounted utility terms)
 in one period than in any other. Because
 the marginal utility of expenditure and
 expenditure itself are monotonically re-
 lated this leads to "smoothing" of con-
 sumption. This principle governs both
 short-run (business cycle/high fre-
 quency) allocation and long-run (life cy-
 cle/low frequency) allocation. Thus
 agents seek to equalize the marginal util-
 ity of money from one period to the next
 and between now and the distant future.
 It is the simultaneous consideration of
 the short run and the long run that gives
 the standard model its power.
 It is important to emphasize that the
 modern view that agents seek to equalize
 the marginal utility of expenditure over
 time is consistent with the existence of
 imperfections in the capital market and
 with habits or satiation. Thus liquidity
 constraints may cause the marginal util-
 ity of expenditure to fall over time (as
 consumption grows over time) in an ex-
 pected way. This is consistent with the
 standard model: agents would prefer to
 have more consumption in the early peri-
 ods but capital market imperfections
 prevent this. Indeed the most general
 model that allows for capital market im-
 perfections and nonadditive preferences
 over time does not seem to impose any
 restrictions on the time path of con-
 sumption and asset prices. It is only
 when we impose restrictions on prefer-
 ences and budgets that we can derive
 testable implications. Thus the standard
 model in its most general form is better
 thought of as a framework than as a di-
 rect source of testable propositions. We
 now consider the sets of restrictions
 sometimes used.
 One collection of assumptions has
 been used widely; we refer to the model
 that uses these assumptions as the cer-
 tainty-equivalence model4 (CEQ model):
 Assumptions for the CEQ model. Agents have
 intertemporally additive utility functions and
 face perfect capital markets. Either there is
 perfect certainty or agents maximize expected
 utility; they form rational expectations and
 have quadratic utility functions.
 This set of assumptions allows us to cap-
 ture some of the motives for saving listed
 at the beginning of this survey, namely
 the life-cycle, intertemporal substitution,
 and bequest motives.5 However, many of
 the other motives that are consistent
 with a standard optimizing model are
 ruled out. Thus, the enterprise and
 downpayment motives are not consistent
 with the perfect capital markets assump-
 tion while the improvement motive is
 ruled out by the assumption that the util-
 ity function is additive over time. Fi-
 nally, the quadratic utility assumption
 rules out the precautionary motive.
 The implications of the CEQ assump-
 tions for consumption and saving have
 been investigated thoroughly over the
 past 40 years and were well understood
 by the mid 1980s. Very broadly, the im-
 plications for consumption are (see Dea-
 ton, 1992, for a very clear account): the
 shape of the lifetime path of consump-
 tion is independent of the shape of the
 expected path of income; the marginal
 propensities to consume out of current
 and future expected income are the
 same; the marginal propensity to con-
 sume out of future income is indepen-
 dent of the riskiness of this income; the
 4 Although widely used, the CEQ terminology is
 not universally accepted. Some investigators refer
 to this variant of the life-cycle model as the Ram-
 sey model or as the Permanent Income Hypothesis
 (PIH) or Rational Expectations PIH (RE-PIH).
 Given the care that Friedman (1957) takes to al-
 low for the precautionary motive and the emphasis
 he places on liquidity constraints this latter termi-
 nology seems to us inappropriate.
 5The bequest motive is incorporated into the
 additive utility function.
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 elderly should run down assets; antici-
 pated changes in income have no effect
 on consumption; and consumption
 changes are orthogonal to past informa-
 tion. Of course, most of these implica-
 tions are highly interrelated and all are
 ultimately derived from the proposition
 that agents keep the expected marginal
 utility of expenditure constant and the
 fact that the latter is linear in consump-
 tion for quadratic utility functions.
 One significant recent addition to our
 understanding of the CEQ model is in
 the incorporation of nonstationary in-
 come processes. The central insight here
 is that although consumption changes
 are uncorrelated with anticipated income
 changes, the actual path of consumption
 may follow quite closely the actual path
 of income if the latter displays some per-
 sistence. To take an extreme example,
 suppose that the planning horizon is infi-
 nite and that the discount rate equals the
 real interest rate. If income is a random
 walk then all income changes are sur-
 prises and consumption is set equal to
 income in every period. In this case we
 have a perfect coincidence between con-
 sumption and income even though the
 agent is formally smoothing. More gen-
 erally, the relationship between income
 and consumption volatility depends on
 the income process and consumption
 may even be less smooth than income for
 plausible income processes; see Deaton
 (1992, ch. 4) for references and further
 discussion.
 Many of the implications of the CEQ
 model implicitly employ supplementary
 assumptions. For example, the conclu-
 sion that consumption and expected in-
 come paths are independent implicitly
 assumes that consumption and labor sup-
 ply are additively separable. If they are
 not, then consumption and expected in-
 come may be correlated. For example,
 many people anticipate retirement a long
 way ahead. If consumption and labor
 supply are complementary (perhaps be-
 cause of the costs of going to work) then
 on retirement both income and con-
 sumption fall. Even though the fall in in-
 come is anticipated, behavior of this sort
 does not invalidate the CEQ model. As
 another example, the orthogonality be-
 tween consumption changes and past in-
 formation holds only under special cir-
 cumstances. For example, if parents pay
 for child care during the day when chil-
 dren are of preschool age these costs can
 be a sizable share of total consumption.
 Typically these costs fall or even disap-
 pear when children start school. The lat-
 ter event is anticipated some time ahead
 so that we can predict the change in con-
 sumption using past information. Thus
 the orthogonality implication is once
 again dependent on the implicit assump-
 tion that the marginal utility of expendi-
 ture does not depend on (predictable)
 events.
 Although tractable, the CEQ is restric-
 tive. Less restrictive alternatives are
 available. For example, we can retain the
 quadratic utility assumption and drop
 one (or more) of the other CEQ assump-
 tions. Generalizations include allowing
 for imperfections in the capital market;
 utility functions that are not time addi-
 tive; nonconstant discount factors; and
 preferences that do not satisfy the ex-
 pected utility axioms.6 The quadratic
 utility assumption itself is, however, un-
 attractive so that another line of investi-
 gation drops this assumption; this leads
 to a model which has been the focus of a
 great deal of theoretical work in the past
 decade.
 2.2 The Standard Additive Model
 In this subsection we discuss the
 model without the assumption that util-
 6We do not consider this extension below be-
 cause it has not yet led to any empirical work on
 micro data. See Larry Epstein (1992) for a discus-
 sion of these models.
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 TABLE 2.1
 STANDARD ADDITIVE MODEL SIMULATIONS
 ? = O? = 0.01 =O0.01
 Y1= 1,Y2=2 Y1=2,Y2= 1 Y1= 1,Y2=2
 First period consumption 1.5 1.49 0.98
 Saving rate -0.5 0.255 0.02
 MPC from cash-on-hand 0.5 0.51 0.97
 MPC from second period earnings 0.5 0.47 0.01
 Discount rate for future expected earnings 0 2% 108%
 Variance of second period log consumption 0 0.01 0.21
 ity is quadratic (or that there is perfect
 certainty). We retain the assumptions of
 additivity over time for the utility func-
 tion and of perfect capital markets. Be-
 cause the latter implies that budgets are
 additive over time we call this less re-
 strictive model the standard additive
 model:7
 Assumptions for the standard additive model.
 Agents have intertemporally additive utility
 functions with a constant discount factor and
 face perfect capital markets. Agents maximize
 expected utility and form rational expecta-
 tions.
 The major difference between this
 model and the CEQ model is, of course,
 the allowance for nonquadratic prefer-
 ences. This may not seem like much of a
 radical difference but it turns out that it
 is. One of the principal lessons that we
 have learned in the past decade is that
 the intuitions derived from the CEQ
 model can be highly misleading in the
 presence of even a small amount of un-
 certainty if agents display prudence (that
 is, the third derivative of the utility func-
 tion is positive; see Miles Kimball 1990).
 To illustrate how misleading the CEQ
 model can be, consider the following
 simple two period model. Assume that
 the agent maximizes expected utility
 with lifetime preferences over the cer-
 tain consumption path (C1,C2) repre-
 sented by the utility function:
 U(C1 ,C2) = lnC, + lnC2.
 Let Y1 be cash-on-hand (first period
 earnings plus any starting wealth) in pe-
 riod 1. Earnings in period 2 are stochas-
 tic; specifically, let second period earn-
 ings be zero with probability ? and Y2
 /(1-C) with probability (1-e). Thus an in-
 crease in e represents a mean preserving
 spread in future earnings risk. Finally,
 we assume that the real rate of interest is
 zero.
 In Table 2.1 we present some calcula-
 tions for three different scenarios: per-
 fect certainty (s=0) with low first period
 cash-on-hand and then uncertainty
 with high and low first period cash-on-
 hand respectively. We calculate first pe-
 riod consumption, the saving rate from
 first period income, the marginal pro-
 pensities to consume (MPC) out of first
 and second period income, the effective
 discount rate used to discount future ex-
 pected earnings (the discount rate for fu-
 ture expected earnings which would give
 the associated first period consumption
 if the agent had quadratic preferences),
 and the variance of second period log
 7 Here we have introduced new nomenclature.
 Some investigators call this set of assumptions the
 "precautionary savin " model or the unwieldy
 "life-cycle model wit-h additive preferences and
 perfect capital markets." We prefer our term to
 the former because the model allows for many
 other motives as well as the precautionary motive
 and it also maintains perfect capital markets which
 many "precautionary" models rule out.
This content downloaded from 129.170.194.173 on Thu, 21 Jun 2018 17:58:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Browning and Lusardi: Household Saving 1803
 consumption. The latter term will be dis-
 cussed in the next subsection.
 A number of features emerge from
 these calculations (see Stephen Zeldes
 1989b; Kimball 1990; and Carroll 1992,
 1993, for further discussion of these).
 First, the degree to which the CEQ
 model approximates the model with un-
 certainty depends on the time path of ex-
 pected income. In particular, if first
 period cash-on-hand is low relative to
 second period expected earnings, then
 there can be wide divergences between
 the CEQ model and the additive model.
 In fact, in this example first period con-
 sumption can be discontinuous in ? at
 ? = 0; this presents obvious problems
 for approximating consumption re-
 sponses about the CEQ predictions. Sec-
 ond, with low first period income the
 MPC out of cash-on-hand can be close to
 unity even though there is "not much"
 uncertainty. Third, with low first period
 income the MPC out of future expected
 income can be close to zero. Thus the
 CEQ prediction that the MPCs out of
 current and future income are the same
 (in a world with independently distrib-
 uted incomes, as here) is wildly wrong
 for some agents. Finally, even a small
 amount of uncertainty may be sufficient
 to stop the agent from borrowing in the
 first period.
 Uncertainty also causes some agents to
 behave as though they discount expected
 future earnings at a higher rate than the
 market rate of interest. Whether or not
 agents do this depends critically on
 whether the agent would save or not in a
 CEQ world (which in turn depends on
 their current assets and the path of fu-
 ture income). In this example, future
 earnings are not discounted very much if
 CEQ saving would be positive (compare
 the final two columns of Table 2.1). This
 suggests that we cannot make a blanket
 prediction that uncertainty causes agents
 to discount future earnings with a rate
 much higher than the real rate. Rather,
 the (implicit) discount rate will depend
 on the ratio of cash-on-hand to expected
 future earnings. Yet another feature of
 this example is that the precautionary
 motive gives rise to behavior that is very
 close to that generated by a CEQ model
 with a borrowing restriction; we shall dis-
 cuss this further in the next subsection.
 One other important feature of this ex-
 ample is also worth discussing at some
 length. The introduction of uncertainty
 in the final column of Table 2.1 leads to
 a considerable welfare loss. For this ex-
 ample, an agent with a certain income
 eight percent lower than the expected
 value of income would be just as well
 off.8 Thus there is considerable scope for
 insurance here because the actuarially
 fair premium would be only two-thirds
 of a percent of expected lifetime income.
 If outcomes are independent across
 many agents then the introduction of a
 social insurance scheme would lead to a
 considerable welfare gain for society.
 This is, of course, the traditional ratio-
 nale for a government unemployment in-
 surance scheme (see Martin Baily, 1978,
 for further discussion of the tradeoff be-
 tween these gains and moral hazard
 losses). If a social insurance scheme is
 introduced here it raises welfare but it
 also lowers saving considerably. From
 Column 3 of Table 2.1, a fully insured
 agent will now borrow an amount equal
 to a little over one half of first period
 income rather than saving a small
 amount. Of course the numbers given
 here are rather extreme but the basic
 point is valid: the introduction of a pre-
 cautionary motive leads to a rationale for
 social insurance and the introduction of
 the latter leads to a consequent attenu-
 ation of the precautionary motive.
 8 This figure of 8% is only illustrative. It would
 be higher for a higher coefficient of relative risk
 aversion and lower if there are many periods so
 that agents could smooth shocks over time.
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 In this example some agents (those
 with low first period cash-on-hand) have
 responses that are "Keynesian" even
 though the framework is a standard addi-
 tive one (see also Robert Barsky, N.
 Gregory Mankiw, and Zeldes 1986).
 Note, however, that although agents are
 free to borrow or lend in this example,
 there is still an important missing mar-
 ket, viz., insurance against the cata-
 strophic income outcome. If moral haz-
 ard and adverse selection problems can
 be overcome or if someone (family,
 friends, or the government, for example)
 provides a floor to consumption even in
 the event of bankruptcy then agents may
 borrow in the first period. However, the
 main point carries over: the CEQ model
 may be a very unreliable guide to saving
 behavior for agents who have a precau-
 tionary motive.
 2.3 The Euler Equation for
 Intertemporal Allocation
 Most recent empirical work on saving
 and consumption employs the optimality
 condition (or Euler equation) implied by
 the standard additive model as a starting
 point. Thus, we turn now to the deriva-
 tion of this Euler equation for consump-
 tion. We denote the within period utility
 function by o(C,Z) where C is consump-
 tion9 and Z is a vector of modifiers for
 utility which we shall refer to as "demo-
 graphics." The usual candidates for in-
 clusion in Z are household composition,
 health status, and labor supply but it can
 be anything that affects household util-
 ity. The discount factor is denoted ,3; it is
 usually taken to be less than unity. Given
 the standard additive model assump-
 tions we can use standard variational
 methods to derive the Euler equation for
 optimal allocation between periods t and
 t + 1:
 'Uc(Ct,Zt) = Et {(13( + it)1c (Ct+b,Zt+l)l (2.1)
 where rt is the real rate between the two
 periods; the -'s denote that the variable
 is stochastic and vc(.) is the partial of
 'uv) with respect to C. This Euler equa-
 tion encapsulates the central insight of
 the standard consumption model, viz.
 that agents try to keep the marginal (dis-
 counted by f3) utility of (discounted by r)
 expenditure constant over time. As we
 shall see in Section 5, the Euler equation
 (2.1) has been the focus of most empiri-
 cal work on consumption since its use in
 Robert Hall (1978). The reason for this
 is that, to estimate the parameters of the
 utility function v(C,Z), we need to ob-
 serve consumption only in two different
 periods, as well as observing interest
 rates and demographics; we do not need
 to observe wealth or model agents' ex-
 pectations. By 1978 the need for the
 latter was increasingly the stumbling
 block in applying life-cycle ideas to the
 empirical analysis of consumption and
 saving behavior. For empirical and
 theoretical work we typically need a
 parameterization for the utility func-
 tion.10 Other than the quadratic form,
 the most widely used is the Constant
 Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) or iso-
 elastic utility function:
 1 [C 1-Y(Z)
 =UCZ (2.2)
 1 - Y(Z) a(Z)J
 The appeal of the iso-elastic form is not
 in its tractability (as we shall see it is not
 particularly easy to manipulate) but in its
 a priori plausibility. Both Friedman
 (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg
 (1954) defend the assumption that in-
 tertemporal preferences over certain
 outcomes are homothetic; that is, a ten
 percent increase in lifetime wealth (or
 9See Browning (1989a) for the extension to a
 many good framework.
 10 See Browning (1989b) for nonparametric (re-
 vealed preference) conditions.
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 permanent income) will lead to a ten
 percent increase in expenditure in each
 period. The implication of this "propor-
 tionality" assumption is that in a per-
 fectly certain world, consumption in any
 period is proportional to lifetime wealth.
 The actual proportion depends on dis-
 count factors, interest rates, the length
 of remaining life, and demographics but
 not the wealth level itself. The other as-
 sumption used widely in the consump-
 tion literature is that utility is additive
 over time. Combining homotheticity
 with intertemporal additivity gives the
 iso-elastic form, hence its popularity.
 The "parameter" y(Z) is the coefficient
 of relative risk aversion; by definition it
 is independent of the level of lifetime
 wealth but not necessarily of demograph-
 ics. Concavity requires that y be positive.
 The function a(Z) is effectively an adult
 equivalence scale; usually we require
 that the marginal utility of consumption
 be increasing in, say, family size.
 We now derive the Euler equation for
 the iso-elastic utility function. To sim-
 plify notation we shall assume that y(.) is
 independent of demographics. From the
 Euler equation (2.1) we have:
 1(1 + rt){ a(Z+) } C1 }
 c(XZt) JLCt
 = 1 + et+, withEt(et+1) = 0. (2.3)
 Let the variance of et+i conditional on
 information available at time t (that is,
 the expected variance) be given by a2
 we refer to this as the consumption
 shock variance. To simplify we take Z to
 be a scalar and parameterize a(Z) =
 exp(oZ) where a is now a parameter.
 Taking logs and using the usual approxi-
 mation for logsll we have the linearized
 Euler equation:
 AlnCt+i = + &AZt+i + ?rt
 + 0. + + ut (2.4)
 where =l/Y(> 0),
 a= a(y- 1)/y
 and ut+1 = - O(et+1 - 0.5 (e 2+, -a2+2))
 so that Et (Ut+1) = 0.
 Before considering this equation in
 detail, it is worth noting that it captures
 in a parsimonious and simple way several
 of the motives listed at the beginning of
 this survey. Thus the life-cycle motive is
 given by the changes in circumstances
 implicit in the AZ variables. The in-
 tertemporal substitution and precaution-
 ary motives are given by the next two
 terms respectively. The bequest motive
 is also present but implicit because it af-
 fects the level of consumption and not
 first differences. In the next subsection we
 shall see that we can also include habits,
 liquidity constraints, and the downpay-
 ment motive. Thus this equation is a po-
 tentially powerful way of organizing our
 thoughts about consumption paths.
 Let us consider the right hand side of
 (2.4) term by term. The first term is a
 discount factor; a lower f can be thought
 of as higher impatience which leads to
 higher consumption in early periods and
 hence lower saving and consumption
 growth. The second term allows for the
 influence of anticipated changes in
 demographics on consumption. Although
 these demographic terms are largely ig-
 nored in the aggregate time series litera-
 ture (for the good reason that they
 change only very gradually in the aggre-
 gate) they are potentially important
 sources of variation in consumption at
 the micro level.
 The coefficient on the interest rate, ?,
 gives the response to the anticipated real
 rate. Thus it is the proportional change
 in consumption consequent on an antici-
 pated one percent change in the dis-
 counted price of consumption (which
 11An alternative is to assume that 1 + et+i is
 log-normally distributed in which case the ap-
 proximation we shall give is exact.
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 equals the real rate of interest). For this
 reason -+ is known as the intertemporal
 substitution elasticity. Here "antici-
 pated" means "keeping the marginal util-
 ity of expenditure constant" so that this
 price response is a (Frisch) compensated
 response and can be signed from the the-
 ory: the coefficient 0 should be positive.
 This restriction is the only integrability
 condition that the (one good) Euler
 equation has to satisfy.
 The time discounting, demographic,
 and interest rate effects are all present
 in the CEQ model but the fourth term
 on the right hand side of (2.4) is absent
 from that model. The term for the con-
 sumption shock variance captures the
 precautionary motive. If the variance of
 future consumption increases then
 agents save more for the future and (ex-
 pected) consumption growth increases.
 This follows because higher uncertainty
 leads agents to lower the level of current
 period consumption in order to increase
 (precautionary) saving. Because the in-
 tertemporal budget constraint is un-
 changed this leads to higher consump-
 tion later (on average).
 In equation (2.4) there is a close link
 between intertemporal substitution and
 prudence (the coefficient on rt is twice
 that on 62 1). This is accidental to the
 CRRA case; it follows because we have
 only one parameter in the utility func-
 tion so this must control both prudence
 and intertemporal substitution.12 In gen-
 eral there is no necessary link between
 risk aversion and prudence. Indeed, risk
 averse agents (ucc < 0) can display im-
 prudence (uccc < 0). Although Marshall
 found this the more compelling case,
 most modern authors have taken it as a
 given that agents are not imprudent (that
 is, ccc, 2 0). Kimball (1990) provides a
 thorough discussion of prudence and its
 links with risk aversion and the precau-
 tionary motive.
 The variance term in (2.4) has been
 the focus of a great deal of recent atten-
 tion. We shall return to this in the em-
 pirical section; for now we note two of
 the most important features of precau-
 tionary saving. The first is that it obvi-
 ously depends on the uncertainty associ-
 ated with future exogenous variables.
 For example, agents who have higher
 variance in future income will have
 higher saving. Also agents who face
 higher uncertainty about future demo-
 graphics will change their saving behav-
 ior. For example, if demographics in-
 clude ill health (and agents do not have
 full medical insurance) then saving will
 reflect changes in the probabilities of ill
 health, over and above the induced
 changes in the distribution of future
 earnings.
 The second important feature of pre-
 cautionary saving is that it depends on
 cash-on-hand (assets plus current earn-
 ings). To illustrate this, consider again
 the two period model developed earlier.
 In the last row of Table 2.1 we presented
 the variances of second period log con-
 sumption. The important point here is
 that this variance is about 20 times
 higher for the case in which first period
 cash-on-hand is low relative to expected
 lifetime income. Moreover, this very
 large difference is not being driven by
 differences in income risk: for both cases
 the second period income process is the
 same. Thus future income variance is
 not, by itself, an adequate proxy for the
 variance term in (2.4); how this risk im-
 pacts on current consumption decisions
 depends on the level of current assets
 12There is a related issue here which is distinct
 from the point being made in the text. In any ex-
 pected utility model that assumes additivity over
 time there is also a necessary link between in-
 tertemporal substitution and risk aversion-agents
 will be not be very responsive to (anticipated)
 changes in the real rate i and only if they are risk
 averse (see Deaton, 1992, for an accessible ac-
 count and Epstein, 1992, for a full discussion).
 This will be the case for any utility function.
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 and income relative to expected future
 income.
 To investigate these issues more
 deeply we need to move beyond the
 Euler equation and consider consump-
 tion functions. Even consideration of the
 simple two period model yields the im-
 portant theoretical point that the non-
 CEQ additive model does not imply that
 agents who expect high future incomes
 (for example, students in medical school)
 will necessarily borrow to finance con-
 sumption in their early years. This is
 the case even if agents have access to
 perfect capital markets. While it is use-
 ful to have simple analytical counter-
 examples, to actually generate predic-
 tions in more realistic environments it
 is necessary to consider many period
 models.
 If we wish to analyze many period
 non-CEQ models then we must have re-
 course either to approximations (see, for
 example, Skinner 1988; or John Camp-
 bell and Mankiw 1989), to the CARA
 utility form (Ricardo Caballero 1990,
 1991), or to simulations. An older exam-
 ple of a simulation that takes explicit ac-
 count of the effect of the precautionary
 motive is given in Keizo Nagatani (1972).
 Nagatani assumes that agents have dis-
 count rates that are a good deal higher
 than the real interest rate and that there
 is consumption growth in the pre-retire-
 ment period. Even though Nagatani's
 theoretical analysis now looks decidedly
 dated his simulations bring out many of
 key features that emerged in the later
 debate. For example, the need for high
 discount rates (or, more generally, some
 form of "impatience") and uncertainty to
 reconcile the standard additive model
 with the observed coincidence of income
 and consumption in the early part of the
 life cycle; the interaction between the ef-
 fects of uncertainty and the ratio of hu-
 man to nonhuman wealth and the differ-
 ence between the marginal propensities
 to consume out of the two types of
 wealth.
 More recently, a number of authors
 have taken simulations much further
 (see, for example, Zeldes 1989b; Deaton
 1991; Carroll 1993; Orazio Attanasio et
 al. 1995; and Glenn Hubbard, Skinner,
 and Zeldes 1994a, 1995). We shall return
 to some of these analyses in the next sec-
 tion when we consider liquidity con-
 straints but for the standard case without
 liquidity constraints, Carroll (1993) and
 Attanasio et al. (1995) provide insights.
 Carroll shows that for particular income
 processes, if we have a precautionary
 motive and "impatience" (the precise
 definition of which will depend on the
 context) then consumption "tracks" in-
 come in the early part of life; effectively,
 it is only in later years (say, after age 45)
 that we observe significant saving. In the
 Carroll model it is the possibility of des-
 titution in later periods that stops agents
 from borrowing in earlier years. This
 leads to "buffer stock" behavior: agents
 have some (typically quite small)
 wealth/income ratio target. If wealth is
 below this then prudence dominates and
 the agent tries to save; above the desired
 ratio, impatience leads agents to run
 down their assets.
 Attanasio et al. (1995) allow for demo-
 graphics and show that we can even do
 without impatience: the fact that chil-
 dren "arrive" early in life is enough to
 induce a strong correlation between con-
 sumption and anticipated income in the
 early part of life (see also James Tobin
 1967). However, children alone are not
 enough to reproduce the typical lifetime
 paths of income and consumption; a pre-
 cautionary motive is also necessary. This
 analysis takes the time paths of income
 and children as given. It would be ex-
 tremely interesting to extend these stud-
 ies of the standard additive model to al-
 low for the fact that, to a certain extent,
 agents choose the time profile and riski-
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 ness of income and also the time path of
 demographics. Thus high education
 agents marry later and start their fami-
 lies later which may be connected to
 their income processes.
 Summing up for the model that allows
 for a precautionary motive, we can state
 that the most important conclusion that
 arises from recent theoretical work on
 consumption and saving is that this
 model is much less restrictive than the
 widely used CEQ model. It is also the
 case that the implications of the CEQ
 model may be a very misleading guide to
 what to expect from a precautionary sav-
 ing model. This increased flexibility is
 both good news and bad news. The good
 news is that the standard additive model
 is a good deal less restrictive than is
 widely thought and is compatible with a
 much richer variety of short-run and life-
 time consumption patterns than is sug-
 gested by the CEQ model. The bad news
 is simply the converse of this. Even if the
 assumptions of the standard additive
 model hold, it has far less predictive
 power than the CEQ model so that esti-
 mation of the parameters of the model
 assumes a greater importance. All of this
 assumes, of course, that the standard ad-
 ditive model is valid for all agents; this is
 by no means universally accepted be-
 cause the assumptions that underpin it
 are questionable. We turn now to a con-
 sideration of relaxing some of these as-
 sumptions.
 2.4 Liquidity Constraints and Habits
 Of all of the assumptions of the stan-
 dard additive model, the one that has
 been most questioned is the existence of
 perfect capital markets (see Fumio
 Hayashi 1987 and Deaton 1992). This is
 usually taken to mean that there is a sin-
 gle rate of interest at which agents can
 borrow or lend as much as they wish.
 This is palpably not the case. First, most
 agents seem to employ a variety of dif-
 ferent borrowing and lending instru-
 ments at the same time so that "the" in-
 terest rate any agent faces (in the sense
 of how much extra consumption could be
 enjoyed next year if one dollar of con-
 sumption is given up this year) is not al-
 ways well defined, much less observable
 by a researcher. It is also the case that
 borrowing rates typically exceed lending
 rates and that people often ask for credit
 and are refused.
 To allow us to capture the essence of
 the effects of liquidity constraints we
 shall adopt a few simplifying assump-
 tions. First we shall assume that interest
 rates are constant and are known when
 consumption in time t is chosen. Second
 we shall assume that there are two rates,
 one for borrowing (= rB) and one for
 lending (= rL) with rL > rL.13 This in-
 cludes the special case for which rB =
 + 00; that is, assets are constrained to be
 non-negative.
 We begin with the very obvious point
 that liquidity constraints are likely to be
 of interest only for agents who want to
 borrow. This has led to investigators con-
 centrating on the case where either
 there is some income growth or agents
 have high time discount factors or
 the "consumption needs" captured by the
 demographic variable occur early in the
 life cycle. Note that the presence of any
 (or even all) of these is not sufficient to
 ensure that agents will want to borrow
 but some such assumptions seem to be
 necessary. With different borrowing and
 lending rates, the revised version of (2.1)
 is given by:
 ?C(Ct, Zd)
 = f3(1 + rv)Etuc(Ct+i, Z4+1) (2.5)
 13 If we allow for uncertain interest rates then
 we need to assume that there is zero probability
 that the realized lending real rate exceeds the re-
 alized borrowing real rate (see Browning and
 Leslie Robb 1985).
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 where rv is the "virtual" interest rate
 used for optimal intertemporal alloca-
 tion. Thus rv is defined to be the real
 rate that ensures that the Euler equation
 holds. It is the lending rate for lenders,
 the borrowing rate for borrowers, and
 some intermediate rate for those who do
 not carry forward assets or debt from
 period t. Note that even if assets are
 constrained to be non-negative (formally,
 rB = + ?? ) rv will still be finite.
 Suppose now that we do not observe
 the interest rate implicitly used by the
 agent but only the lending rate. This
 gives:
 ljC(Ct,Zt)
 ? f(1 + rL)EtuC(Ct+l, Zt+1) (2.6)
 with equality if the agent is a lender.
 Thus in expectation, the marginal utility
 of expenditure using the lending rate to
 discount is nonincreasing rather than
 constant. This can be rewritten in more
 familiar Lagrange multiplier form as:
 uc(ct, Zt)
 = |(1 + rL)(l + lVt)EtL)c(Ct+i, Zt+i) (2.7)
 where Vt ? 0 and VtAt + I < 0 (where At+1
 is the level of assets carried forward
 from period t to t + 1). The value of Vj
 is (rv - rL)/(1 + rL); because rv > rL this
 is automatically non-negative and attains
 its maximum at rv = rB.
 We can incorporate this into the Euler
 equation for the iso-elastic case:
 LlnCt+l = f + aAZM+j + 4rL
 + 0.5 0 02 1 + Oln(l+Wt) + ut + 1. (2.8)
 rhus consumption growth between t and
 t + 1 is higher for liquidity constrained
 agents than for those who carry forward
 some assets (see Zeldes 1989a; and Dea-
 ton 1992). That liquidity constrained
 agents will consume less in the current
 period than they would like is almost
 tautologous; it hardly requires (2.8) to
 show this. There are, however, more in-
 teresting implications.
 One trivial consequence of liquidity
 constraints is that if zero assets are car-
 ried forward for many periods then con-
 sumption changes will be set equal to
 (earned) income changes over this pe-
 riod. In these periods, the Euler equa-
 tion (2.1) will not hold if we use the
 lending rate to discount future values.
 Instead the agent will appear to be a
 "rule of thumb" agent who simply sets
 consumption equal to income. There is,
 however, one critical difference between
 the behavior of a liquidity constrained
 agent and one who sets income equal to
 consumption in each period. For the for-
 mer, we may observe periods in which
 the agent saves and hence periods in
 which consumption is either lower or
 higher than earnings. This asymmetry
 and the consequent difference from
 "rule of thumb" behavior will be ex-
 plored in Section 5.
 The behavior of a liquidity constrained
 agent may also be similar to an agent
 who can borrow as much as desired but
 who has a significant precautionary
 motive (see Carroll 1993). In equation
 (2.8), the effects of increased uncertainty
 (higher 62) and the effects of a more
 tightly binding liquidity constraint
 (higher N') are identical. Moreover, cur-
 rent cash-on-hand is negatively corre-
 lated with both variables. It is also the
 case that the marginal propensities to
 consume out of current and future in-
 come are similar for both types of agent.
 Thus it may be very difficult to empiri-
 cally distinguish the effects of liquidity
 constraints and a strong precautionary
 motive.
 There is another important effect of li-
 quidity constraints that we can see oper-
 ating in (2.8) (see Deaton 1991). Even
 for an agent who is not liquidity con-
 strained between periods t and t + 1,
 the variance term (Y2+ may be larger be-
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 cause of possible liquidity constraints be-
 tween periods t + 1 and t + 2. This fol-
 lows because the possibility of borrowing
 provides some insurance; agents who are
 not liquidity constrained can tide them-
 selves over runs of bad luck by borrow-
 ing against future income. If this option
 is removed then the variance of future
 consumption is increased. Thus the mere
 possibility of being constrained in the fu-
 ture may increase consumption growth
 for agents even if, ex post, they are never
 actually observed to be constrained (for
 example, even if they always carry for-
 ward positive assets).
 The possibility of future liquidity con-
 straints also has another implication for
 intertemporal allocation. This effect de-
 rives from the budget constraint. Sup-
 pose that at time t the agent knows that
 they will be constrained between periods
 t + sandt + s + IsothatAt+s+l =0.
 Then the budget constraint between pe-
 riods t and t + s depends only on as-
 sets at time t and earnings in periods t to
 t + s. Thus it is as though the agent acts
 with a short time horizon (here equal to
 s + 1 periods); the presence of possible
 future liquidity constraints may lead
 agents to behave as though they are less
 forward looking than is suggested by the
 standard additive model. Once again, the
 role of family composition may be criti-
 cal. If consumption "needs" peak when
 there are older children in the home and
 households are liquidity constrained,
 then it may be that saving "for! retire-
 ment" begins only when children leave
 home.
 This distinction between long-run and
 short-run behavior is potentially impor-
 tant. As we have stressed above, one of
 the most remarkable features of the stan-
 dard consumption model is that it gives
 predictions for both the short run and
 the long run. In a model without liquid-
 ity constraints, agents set current con-
 sumption to equalize the current and ex-
 pected next period marginal utility of ex-
 penditure but they also set this level to
 equalize the expected marginal utility of
 expenditure in the distant future. The
 presence of liquidity constraints may
 break the link between long-run and
 short-run behavior. Thus we may ob-
 serve agents smoothing over the short
 run but not over the long run.
 We now turn to other features of the
 consumption function with liquidity con-
 straints. Once we include even highly
 stylized representations for real needs or
 constraints then we have to resort to
 simulations to recover the consumption
 function. Here we present some of the
 main results from Deaton (1991) and
 Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994a,
 1995).
 Deaton (1991) presents results for
 infinitely lived, liquidity constrained
 agents who face both stationary and non-
 stationary earnings processes (see also
 Deaton 1992, section 6.2). Assuming im-
 patience, which in this context means
 choosing parameters so that agents
 would "typically want to borrow," Dea-
 ton uses numerical techniques to derive
 the consumption function for various in-
 come processes. For the i.i.d. income
 case the consumption function is particu-
 larly simple. To a close approximation,
 consumption is set equal to cash-on-
 hand (current income plus assets) if the
 latter is below mean income; otherwise
 consumption is set equal to mean income
 plus some fraction of cash-on-hand
 above mean income (the fraction is 0.3
 in the case Deaton examines). Deaton
 calls such behavior "buffer stock" behav-
 ior because agents accumulate assets
 only to insulate themselves from income
 fluctuations. One of the most interesting
 features of these results is that even
 small levels of assets can achieve consid-
 erable smoothing of consumption. For
 the i.i.d. case, mean assets are equal to
 one month's income but the standard de-
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 viation of consumption is only half of
 that of income. As we introduce more
 persistence into income, however, agents
 achieve less smoothing and as income
 approaches a random walk the variance
 of consumption tends to that of income.
 Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994a,
 1995), in what is certainly the richest set
 of simulation studies attempted to date,
 consider liquidity constrained agents in
 an environment with a number of
 sources of uncertainty. Specifically, they
 allow for uncertainty over earnings (in-
 cluding unemployment insurance bene-
 fits), medical expenses (which are highly
 persistent), and the length of life. Earlier
 studies typically focused on only one
 source of risk. In the Hubbard, Skinner,
 and Zeldes simulations there is no be-
 quest motive; earnings are exogenous (so
 the retirement date is given and is inde-
 pendent of the state of health); and the
 government provides a low consumption
 floor ($7,000 in their benchmark model).
 The richness of the environment that
 Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes consider
 brings out the importance of institutional
 factors such as unemployment and medi-
 cal insurance schemes.
 One of the most important features
 that Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes incor-
 porate into their simulations is the pres-
 ence of an assets test for medical and in-
 come support benefits. This leads to a
 nonconvexity in the environment which
 induces many agents to rationally hold
 very low levels of assets. They compare
 their benchmark model (which has mod-
 erate rates of time discounting) with a
 liquidity constrained CEQ model and
 what they term a buffer stock model
 (high discount rates and a low consump-
 tion floor). In general the predictions of
 the three sets of models are quite differ-
 ent; we shall discuss the comparisons of
 these predictions with the data in a later
 section. We note, however, that Hub-
 bard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994a, 1995)
 do not present simulations for a model
 with perfect capital markets so that it is
 difficult to isolate exactly the differences
 made by allowing for a precautionary
 motive.
 The second generalization of the addi-
 tive model that we consider is to allow
 for nonadditive utility functions. Even
 leaving aside durables, the incorporation
 of some dependence of current tastes on
 past consumption has long been thought
 desirable. For example, some notion that
 consumption is "habit forming" implic-
 itly underlies Keynes' "improvement"
 motive (motive 4 in the list at the begin-
 ning of the paper). In such models, up-
 ward changes in consumption have a
 smaller utility effect than similar down-
 ward ones so that agents will not want to
 start off with high levels of consump-
 tion.
 The analysis of temporal dependencies
 in preferences has a long history, see
 Browning (1991) for further discussion
 and references. Essentially two different
 models have been used almost exclu-
 sively in the consumption literature. The
 first of these is the "habits-as-durables"
 model in which the effects of past con-
 sumption are captured in a (psychologi-
 cal) stock of habits which increases the
 current marginal utility of consumption.
 The other model is the "short memory"
 model in which only last period con-
 sumption matters. These models are
 used because the effect of the past is
 captured by a single state variable (the
 stock of habits and last period consump-
 tion, respectively). We refer the reader
 to Deaton (1992) for further discussion
 of nonadditive preferences; here we sim-
 ply remark that their introduction into
 the model further weakens the possibil-
 ity of deriving simple testable implica-
 tions from the standard consumption
 model.
 In practice there are very many goods,
 some durable or satiating, some habit
This content downloaded from 129.170.194.173 on Thu, 21 Jun 2018 17:58:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1812 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIV (December 1996)
 forming, and some nondurable. It is our
 belief that ultimately an adequate under-
 standing of consumption and saving pat-
 terns will require a recognition that
 there are many goods and some of these
 are durable and that even the nondur-
 ables may be satiating or habit forming.
 For example, Browning and Thomas
 Crossley (1995) suggest that agents
 smooth welfare levels over an unemploy-
 ment spell by postponing the purchase of
 small durables and clothing. This leads
 to a sizable change in total expenditure
 levels but a much less significant change
 in utility levels because the service flows
 from old durables do not change signifi-
 cantly during an unemployment spell.
 Thus agents can smooth by having re-
 course to "internal" capital markets even
 if they are formally liquidity constrained.
 In this section we have reviewed some
 of the recent developments in the theory
 of intertemporal allocation. As we have
 seen, the past decade has seen an inten-
 sive investigation of several alternatives
 to the traditional CEQ model. One
 strand of this, which we call the standard
 additive model, retains the assumptions
 of the CEQ model concerning time-addi-
 tive preferences and the existence of
 perfect capital markets but allows for
 precautionary saving. Perhaps surpris-
 ingly, this apparently modest increase in
 generality admits a much wider range of
 predictions, particularly when we have
 some latitude in the income process that
 we impute to agents. We have shown
 how different the predictions of the stan-
 dard additive model can be from the
 CEQ model and we emphasize again that
 the latter may not be a good "bench-
 mark" for the non-CEQ model. This is
 not to say that the CEQ model is wrong,
 simply that it is far more restrictive than
 was previously thought. The other gener-
 alizations include allowing for liquidity
 constraints and for habits, satiation, and
 durability. Which of these extensions (if
 any) is the most fruitful is an empirical
 matter.
 The different hypotheses given above
 have different implications for consump-
 tion and saving. One way to test between
 these hypotheses is by formal testing; we
 shall return to this in Section 5 below.
 Another approach is to see how well the
 various theories "fit" the facts. For exam-
 ple, most standard models predict that
 old people should dissave. It seems a
 straightforward question to ask whether
 they typically do. To do this fitting of
 facts, we first need to agree on what the
 facts are. It is to this that we now turn.
 3. Facts on Household Saving
 3.1 Saving: Data Sets and
 Measurement Issues
 We begin with a summary of the data
 sets that allow us to examine the micro
 facts concerning household saving in the
 U.S. In Table 3.1 we list eight different
 sources that can be used to look at saving
 behavior at the micro level; many of
 these can also be used to examine
 wealth. As can be seen from Table 3.1
 there are a variety of sources covering
 different periods and different groups.
 For example, the HRS, the AHEAD, and
 the RHS data sets allow us to study the
 saving behavior of the elderly, while the
 other data sets consider the entire popu-
 lation. The SCF has the advantage of
 oversampling the rich households, who,
 as we will see below, do most of the sav-
 ing.
 To define saving we take the usual
 budget condition for financial assets:
 At+1= (I+r)At+Yt- Ct (3.1)
 where A, r, Y, and C are financial assets,
 the real rate, earnings, and consumption,
 respectively. We can define saving as the
 first difference of assets (= At+i - At) or,
 equivalently, as (earned plus capital) in-
 come minus consumption (= rAt + Yt -
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 TABLE 3.1
 U.S. DATA SETS FOR SAVING
 Definition Major
 Data Set Period of Saving Features
 Survey of Consumer 1962/63;1983/ First difference of wealth Big attrition. Oversampling
 Finances (SCF) 86/89;1992 (Direct measure in 1992) of rich. Pension provider
 surveys.
 Consumer Expenditure 1960/61; 1972/73 Income minus consumption Measurement error
 Survey (CES) 1980-present in income.
 Panel Study of Income 1968-present First difference of wealth Active and passive saving.
 Dynamics (PSID) 1984/89
 Health and Retirement 1992-present First difference of wealth Only older respondents.
 Survey (HRS) Pension provider surveys.
 Asset and Health Dynamics 1993-present First difference of wealth Only very older respondents.
 Survey (AHEAD)
 Survey of Income and 1984-present First difference of wealth Overlapping panels. Only
 Program Participation some components of
 (SIPP) wealth.
 National Longitudinal Various, depending First difference of wealth Various specific cohorts
 Survey (NLS) on survey followed.
 Longitudinal Retirement 1969-79 First difference of wealth Aged 58-63 in 1969.
 History Survey (RHS) bi-annual
 Ct). At the aggregate level, saving has
 been measured in these two ways: from
 the National Income and Product Ac-
 counts (NIPA) as the difference between
 personal outlays and disposable personal
 income and from the Flow of Funds
 (FOF) of the Federal Reserve System as
 the household sector's net acquisition of
 assets (including housing) minus its net
 accumulation of liabilities (see John Wil-
 son et al., 1989, for an analysis of the
 discrepancies between the NIPA and
 FOF measures of saving). These simple
 schemes are not without difficulties
 which ultimately derive from the fact
 that we can have different measures of
 saving for different purposes. For exam-
 ple, the NIPA definition gives a very pre-
 cise measure of the flow of funds by
 households that are available for invest-
 ment. This may differ from, say, saving
 for retirement as perceived by house-
 holds.
 One problem with the NIPA definition
 is that it includes the purchase of dur-
 ables in consumption which implicitly as-
 sumes that such goods are consumed at
 once even though they are best thought
 of as additions to the stock of durables.
 An additional problem for the "income
 minus consumption" definition is that
 contributions to funded government re-
 tirement plans are not included in per-
 sonal income and are thus not included
 in saving. Even more bothersome is the
 fact that changes in inflation change the
 level of saving as measured by the NIPA
 definition. In an inflationary period,
 nominal interest rates incorporate the
 expectations of net capital losses on fixed
 dollar financial assets. One therefore has
 to account for the fact that higher inter-
 est rates are just the compensation for
 capital losses. Without adjustment, an in-
 crease in inflation causes the saving rate,
 as measured in the NIPA, to rise (see
 Patric Hendershott and Joe Peek 1989).
 It will be clear, then, that even at the
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 aggregate level there are difficult prob-
 lems in defining "household sector" sav-
 ing. These problems do not dissolve
 when we move to the individual house-
 hold level. At this level, we can obviously
 use either of the two definitions of sav-
 ing: income minus consumption or first
 differences of wealth. But which mea-
 sure of consumption, income, and wealth
 should we take? We have already dis-
 cussed some of the problems with the
 former two. As for wealth, as already
 mentioned there is no "correct" defini-
 tion of wealth but rather measures that
 are more or less useful for different pur-
 poses. The only circumstance under
 which one could define wealth in a uni-
 versally applicable way would be if the
 CEQ assumptions outlined in the pre-
 vious section held. In that case expected
 future receipts (irrespective of their
 riskiness and liquidity) have the same
 impact on current decisions as currently
 held liquid assets. In general, however,
 the riskiness and fungibility of different
 assets and liabilities has an effect and
 this leads to ambiguity about which mea-
 sure of wealth is useful in any particular
 application. Thus it may be useful in
 some contexts to include a measure of,
 say, "pension wealth" while in other cir-
 cumstances we may even want to exclude
 the current stock of durables.
 However we define saving at the
 household level we need to make adjust-
 ments to reconcile these values with ag-
 gregate numbers. Partly this is because
 micro data does not provide the same in-
 formation as aggregate statistics. Also,
 the change in net worth of the household
 sector differs from the NIPA and FOF
 measure of saving because those two
 measures ignore the effects of changes in
 the prices of assets already in the portfo-
 lios of the household sector. A final
 problem with the micro data is the noisi-
 ness of the saving data at the household
 level (see, for example, Robert Avery
 and Kennickell 1991; Barry Bosworth,
 Gary Burtless, and Sabelhaus 1991; At-
 tanasio 1993; and Alessie, Lusardi, and
 Trea Aldershof 1994). Differencing an
 already noisy series (wealth) can lead to
 very high (and spurious) variability in the
 saving level.
 There is also a more prosaic reason
 why the aggregate and micro saving rates
 may not coincide: the aggregate saving
 rate is the ratio of two means which will
 not generally equal the mean of saving to
 income at the micro level. That is, the
 aggregate saving rate and the average
 saving rate can be different even if based
 on exactly the same definitions. To illus-
 trate that this difference may be signifi-
 cant, suppose that log income is normally
 distributed and that saving is a piecewise
 linear function of income. Specifically,-
 let saving be zero for households with
 below median income. For households in
 the top half of the income distribution,
 let saving be 30 percent of any income
 above median income.14 If log income
 has a mean of zero and a standard devia-
 tion of unity then simple simulations
 give that the aggregate saving rate is 16
 percent while the average (micro) saving
 rate is only seven percent (and the me-
 dian saving rate is zero!). This should al-
 ways be kept in mind when comparing
 aggregate saving rates with the average
 rates given below.
 3.2 Household Saving: The Facts
 We present here some facts about
 household saving in the U.S. We exam-
 ine the behavior of saving across age,
 family composition, income, education,
 and wealth groups. Note that these are
 all simple bivariate analyses; conclusions
 that are drawn may not necessarily hold
 in a multivariate framework. Before
 turning to the distribution of saving
 14 This saving function is suggested by the simu-
 lations in Deaton (1991).
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 TABLE 3.2
 SAVING RATES (%), BY AGE
 Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 +
 Saving ratio 1972/73 9.5 12.1 16.8 22.9 14.9
 Saving ratio 1982/85 9.6 8.6 10.5 15.8 11.5
 Source: Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991, table 3. Data set: CES). Saving equals income minus
 consumption.
 across age groups we should first note
 that people and not households have
 ages. It is important to bear in mind that
 different members of the household may
 have very different saving propensities.
 In particular, if young people stay at
 home and accumulate savings, this will
 be attributed to their parents in the fol-
 lowing calculations. As to the facts: both
 Avery and Kennickell (1991) (who derive
 saving from first differencing wealth)
 and Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus
 (1991) (who derive saving both from dif-
 ferencing wealth and from income minus
 consumption) show that saving is positive
 for every age group. As can be seen from
 Table 3.2, mean saving rates increase un-
 til the period around retirement and
 then decrease. The other obvious feature
 of this table is that saving rates declined
 between 1973 and 1983 for all of the
 over-35 age groups. In Table 3.3 we see
 that mean saving levels are a good deal
 higher than median levels which simply
 reflects the fact that saving levels are
 right skewed. The other obvious feature
 of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 is that saving ap-
 pears to increase until the mid or late
 60s. Finally, note that the median level
 of saving is quite low; indeed, a great
 many households make no saving at all.
 Another demographic factor which is
 important for saving behavior is the com-
 position of the household. Looking at
 saving across household types, saving
 rates are higher for married couples with
 no children and lower for households
 with children, while lone parents have
 the lowest saving rate in the population
 (see Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus
 1991; and Avery and Kennickell 1991).
 James Smith (1994), who defines saving
 by first differencing wealth in the PSID
 waves in 1984 and 1989, finds evidence
 of a relationship between saving and
 marriage. Households who were continu-
 ously married enjoyed a large increase in
 assets of 7.1 percent per year. In con-
 trast, asset growth for households who
 never remarried was half as large and
 was negative among widowed and sepa-
 rated families. Income disparities among
 alternative household configurations do
 not seem to account for all of these dif-
 ferences.
 The distribution of saving across in-
 come groups shows a very strong positive
 relationship between income and saving.
 In particular, a large proportion of total
 saving is due to families in the top part
 of the income distribution. According to
 Avery and Kennickell (1991), an over-
 whelming proportion of total saving is
 due to the top income decile of families.
 The same finding is reproduced in Bos-
 worth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991).
 They find that saving is usually negative
 for the first and second income quintile
 and highest in the top quintile.
 Some of the observed correlation be-
 tween income and saving is attributable
 to measurement error in income if saving
 is defined as income minus consumption.
 In addition, any consumption smoothing
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 TABLE 3.3
 (THREE YEAR) SAVING LEVELS, BY AGE
 Age 20-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-69 Over 70
 Mean Saving 13,300 14,800 18,700 22,400 30,500 1,400
 Median Saving 2,400 3,200 4,200 500 500 -500
 Source: Avery and Kennickell (1991, table 7. Data set: SCF). Saving equals 1986 wealth minus 1983 wealth. All
 values in 1986 dollars.
 story will give a positive correlation be-
 tween current income and saving be-
 cause transitory income shocks will lead
 to higher current income and to more
 saving. It seems unlikely to us, however,
 that these are the main factors in the
 positive correlation between income and
 saving. There is far more cross-section
 variation in income than there is mea-
 surement error or "within" variation
 from year to year for most agents. If this
 is the case, then the observed positive
 correlation is due to genuine permanent
 differences in saving behavior. This can be
 checked by looking at indicators for "per-
 manent" income, for example, education.
 Given the correlation between income
 and education, it will come as no sur-
 prise that the distribution of saving
 across education groups also shows a dis-
 tinct pattern of higher saving for higher
 education groups (see Avery and Ken-
 nickell 1991; Douglas Bernheim and
 Scholz 1993; and Attanasio 1993). At-
 tanasio (1993) takes account of cohorts
 when examining saving across education
 groups and shows that the age profile of
 saving is hump-shaped for each educa-
 tion group, but especially for highly edu-
 cated households. There is nothing in
 our theory models to predict that low
 education group, should have low saving
 rates and some studies have indicated
 that households without a college degree
 tend to save very little, possibly "too" lit-
 tle (see Bernheim and Scholz 1993).
 Saving is also very concentrated in the
 top part of the wealth distribution in the
 U.S. Avery and Kennickell (1991) record
 that almost all of the net saving between
 1983 and 1986 was made by the top
 decile of the 1986 wealth distribution.
 Although some of this is spurious (be-
 cause saving is defined as the difference
 between wealth in 1986 and 1983) it
 clearly reflects the importance of the
 rich in the saving distribution. Note also
 that there have been sharp changes in
 the wealth distribution per se, and the
 1980s witnessed an increase in inequality
 in the wealth distribution (see Edward
 Wolff 1994). Finally, we simply note that
 saving is typically higher for homeowners
 and among those who hold stocks and
 bonds (see Bosworth, Burtless, and Sa-
 belhaus 1991; and Avery and Kennickell
 1991).
 The picture that emerges from these
 facts is that saving is concentrated
 among those with high income/wealth/
 education. These findings pose some
 problems for theory. These include: why
 do so many households save so little?
 What motivates the saving behavior of
 the wealthy? In addition we could ask: is
 the saving behavior of the elderly consis-
 tent with any standard model?
 4. The Decline in the U.S. Saving Rate
 4.1 Evidence on the Decline
 in the Saving Rate
 As seen in Table 3.2, saving rates seem
 to have declined sharply in the U.S. in
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 TABLE 4.1
 AGGREGATE SAVING RATES, 1970-1990
 "Revised" "Old"
 Year Figures Figures
 1970-74 (AVERAGE) 8.2 8.5
 1975-79 (AVERAGE) 7.3 7.5
 1980 7.9 7.1
 1981 8.8 7.5
 1982 8.6 6.8
 1983 6.8 5.4
 1984 8.0 6.1
 1985 6.4 4.5
 1986 6.0 4.3




 Source: Economic Report of the President. 1988 for "old" figures and 1995 for
 "revised" figures.
 the recent past. This is important enough
 to merit detailed consideration for two
 reasons. First, it is of interest in and of
 itself. Second, this is a useful testing
 ground for the theory and more struc-
 tural empirical work: do these provide
 any insight into the movements of saving
 over time?
 The aggregate series we shall concen-
 trate on is the NIPA measure which
 gives what is widely regarded as the best
 measure of funds available for invest-
 ment. In Table 4.1 we present two series
 for this measure from 1970 to 1990.
 These represent published values from
 1988 and 1995. As can be seen, the two
 sets of figures tell rather different stories
 about the change in the saving rate in
 the 1980s. The earlier set of figures are
 those that gave rise to much of the de-
 bate recorded below but the later (re-
 vised) figures are, presumably, more reli-
 able. For us, the important feature of the
 revised series is the abruptness of the
 fall between 1984 and 1987.15 The other
 important fact concerning the aggregate
 saving rate over time is that there has
 also been a long-term decline since the
 mid-1950s.
 Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus
 (1991) use aggregate data to document
 that between 1976/80 and 1986/90 total
 private saving as a percentage of net na-
 tional product fell from 9.2 percent to
 6.3 percent.16 Part of this fall was due to
 a fall in retained earnings by corpora-
 tions, which went from 2.8 percent to 1.6
 percent. Personal saving (total private
 saving minus retained earnings) fell from
 6.4 percent to 4.7 percent. This change
 of -1.7 percent also masks some impor-
 tant differences in composition: -1.3 per-
 15 Detection of structural changes "by eye" is
 notoriously subjective and other viewers of the re-
 vised series may see more of a gradual decline
 from 1982 with 1984 as an outlier.
 16The values from the revised figures reported
 in Table 4.1 are 7.1% and 4.6% respectively which
 indicates a similar fall in the rate.
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 cent was accounted for by changes in pri-
 vate pension reserves while state and lo-
 cal government pension saving actually
 increased by +0.5 percent. Nonpension
 saving by households ("other personal
 saving") fell from a rate of 3.2 percent to
 2.2 percent which accounts for the
 other -1.0 percent. Thus the aggregate
 data suggest that the saving rate of
 households (net of pension and retained
 earnings) fell by about one third over
 this decade.
 As discussed in Section 3, the treat-
 ment of durables, housing, pensions, in-
 flation, and capital gains can distort the
 message of the aggregate statistics. It is
 thus legitimate to question whether ac-
 counting for these factors changes the
 pattern over time. Hendershott and Peek
 (1989) correct the ("old") official NIPA
 saving series by adding saving via net
 purchases of government pension assets
 (including social security, which is debat-
 able) and consumer durables17 and by
 subtracting the part of aftertax interest
 income attributable to inflation. Their
 finding is that the resulting alternative
 measures of the personal and private sav-
 ing rate in the 1983-85 period are five
 percent (not percentage points) below
 their averages since 1950 and not, as re-
 ported in the official statistics, at all-
 time lows and 20 percent below their
 post-1950 averages. They also found that
 both personal and private saving have re-
 bounded somewhat in 1983-85, again in
 contrast to the official series.
 As mentioned before, the calculation
 of saving using the NIPA or FOF does
 not take into account capital gains on the
 assets already in the portfolio of the
 households (see also David Bradford
 1990). Skinner and Daniel Feenberg
 (1990) calculate an alternative measure
 of the saving rate that includes capital
 gains in housing and stocks (these gains
 are also added to national income). They
 find that this measure implied a saving
 rate of over 15 percent during 1983-88;
 this is approximately equal to the saving
 rate during the period 1974-79.
 Given the many possible different
 definitions of saving, it is possible that
 some measures did decline and others
 did not. This is how we interpret the
 findings on the aggregate statistics that
 we have presented. If concern focuses on
 the flow of funds for investment pur-
 poses, then there probably was a sub-
 stantial decline between the late 1970s
 and the late 1980s. On the other hand,
 there is much less evidence that wider
 measures of saving did experience such a
 sharp fall (if any at all).
 The results discussed above are based
 on aggregate data. Before discussing the
 small amount of evidence on micro data
 we note once again that changes in ag-
 gregate and individual saving rates are
 not necessarily linked. At the end of Sec-
 tion 3.1 above we discussed why the lev-
 els of the saving rate might differ. The
 same is true of changes. Suppose, for ex-
 ample, that there is a redistribution of
 income from high savers to low savers.
 This will lower the aggregate saving rate
 even if individual saving rates remain
 constant for everyone.
 The main study that documents the
 decline in saving using micro data is Bos-
 worth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991).
 As discussed in Section 3, the compari-
 son between micro and macro data is not
 straightforward; many adjustments need
 to be made to make the different data
 comparable. Bosworth, Burtless, and Sa-
 belhaus (1991) consider four major ad-
 17 Using aggregate data, David Wilcox (1991)
 documents that dfurable goods outlays have been
 the fastest growing category of real personal ex-
 penditure during the 1980s. They expanded at an
 average rate of 5% per year and in 1989 accounted
 for 16.1% of total personal consumption expendi-
 ture as against a share of 12.3% in 1980. Even
 though some of this variation may be due to cycli-
 cal variation it does appear that there has been an
 increase in the share of durables expenditures in
 the 1980s.
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 justments: the accumulation of reserves
 within private pension and welfare
 funds; home ownership and rental costs;
 business income; and third-party pay-
 ments. They use data from two micro
 data sets: the CES and the SCF. On the
 CES, they define saving as income minus
 consumption and find that the national
 average saving rate fell from 15.1 per-
 cent in 1972/73 to 10.8 percent in
 1982/85 (see Table 3.2). For the SCF
 they use panels in 1962/63 and 1983/85
 and first difference wealth. The change
 here is from 14 percent in 1963 to 9.5
 percent in 1985. Perhaps the most con-
 vincing aspect of this evidence is that
 two different surveys and two different
 measures are used yet the results are
 similar for both the levels and for the de-
 cline.
 The micro figures referred to in the
 last paragraph take 1982/85 as the "later"
 period and indicate a decline from pre-
 vious decades. The revised aggregate fig-
 ures, however, show only a small decline
 for 1982/85 relative to the previous de-
 cade. Thus there is some ambiguity as
 the exact date of the decline in the
 1980s. There is general agreement, how-
 ever, that there has been a much longer
 downward trend. We turn now to expla-
 nations of these changes in the saving
 rate.
 4.2 Reasons for the Decline
 in the Saving Rate
 When discussing changes in the saving
 rate, it would be desirable to use directly
 the formal models that we discussed in
 Section 2 to organize our discussion. Un-
 fortunately the CEQ model seems too
 narrow to be used in a discussion of this
 issue and more general models do not
 yield simple relationships that are easy to
 exploit. Thus we proceed by considering
 relatively informal analyses of the rea-
 sons for the decline in saving rates. Very
 broadly there seem to be eleven differ-
 ent possible explanations so far explored
 in the literature: changes in the age
 structure of the population; changes in
 the saving propensities of different
 cohorts; changes in household struc-
 ture; increased government insurance;
 changes in the distribution of income;
 the decline in aggregate growth; capital
 gains on housing; capital gains on stocks;
 the increased annuitization of wealth;
 cash payouts by firms to shareholders;
 and the development of financial mar-
 kets. The variety of proposed explana-
 tions is per se an indication that there
 exists little consensus on what underlies
 the decline in saving rates. As well as
 these, there are also "behavioral" expla-
 nations that we shall also discuss.
 The age structure of the population is
 the critical variable to consider in a
 Modigliani style life cycle model. If
 there is an increase in the proportion of
 the population that is elderly then we
 should expect the saving rate to decline
 because the elderly are supposed to be
 net dissavers. There seems to be a
 general consensus that this is not caus-
 ing the decline (see, among others,
 Lawrence Summers and Carroll 1987;
 Alan Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1990; Bern-
 heim 1991; and the discussion of Poterba
 to the paper of Bosworth, Burtless, and
 Sabelhaus 1991). Partly this is because
 saving rates do not seem to vary dramati-
 cally across age groups (see Table 3.2)
 and partly because the change in the age
 structure is too small to be able to ex-
 plain the decline of saving in the 1980s.
 An alternative to the "age" explanation
 is a "cohort" explanation: people coming
 to maturity in different times (the 1930s
 and the 1960s, say) may have different
 attitudes to risk, thrift, and borrowing
 (as well as many other things). Michael
 Boskin and Lawrence Lau (1988) find a
 substantial difference in the propensity
 to save by households born before and
 after 1939. This effect is substantial
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 enough, according to their estimate, that
 if the younger generation had the same
 saving propensities as the older cohort
 then the ratio of saving to GNP in the
 period 1963-80 would have been 10 per-
 cent higher. These findings are in con-
 trast with the conclusions of Bosworth,
 Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991). They in-
 terpret the finding that saving declined
 for almost every age group (again, see
 Table 3.2) to argue that there is no evi-
 dence that the decline is concentrated
 among households headed by members
 of the baby-boom generation. In fact,
 both the data sets they used indicate that
 the relative decline in saving has been
 smaller among younger households,
 while the decline is more pronounced
 for household aged 45 or older.
 It may be that different investigators
 are drawing different conclusions from
 similar facts because they are using dif-
 ferent (implicit) identifying assumptions.
 It is impossible to disentangle age, co-
 hort, and time effects without some
 identifying assumption (because year of
 birth plus age equals the current year).
 We can illustrate this by considering Ta-
 ble 3.2 in which the age bands are ten
 years wide and the two data sets are ten
 years apart (so that the cohort aged 25-
 34 in 1972/73 is aged 35-44 in 1982/85).
 This allows us to read off cohort saving
 rates and see how they change over time.
 Looking at these "diagonals" for those
 aged under 54 in 1972/73 we see that co-
 hort saving rates are fairly stable over
 time; the changes are only -1 percent, -
 1.6 percent, and -0.9 percent for the co-
 horts born in 1918-27, 1928-37, and
 1938-47 respectively.18
 To illustrate the importance of the
 identifying assumption in this context,
 suppose that we assume that there are no
 age effects. Then Table 3.2 suggests a
 modest period effect (an average decline
 of about 1.2% with small intercohort dif-
 ferences) and strong cohort effects (with
 a bigger drop between the eldest cohort
 and the middle cohort than between the
 latter and the youngest cohort). Alterna-
 tively one can identify everything by as-
 suming that there are no cohort effects.
 In this case, if there were no period ef-
 fect (that is, no decline over time) then
 younger cohorts would behave just like
 older cohorts did the previous decade.
 That is, the youngest cohort would have
 had a saving rate of 12.1 percent in
 1982/85 rather than the observed rate of
 8.6 percent. This implies large period ef-
 fects of -3.5 percent and -6.3 percent
 for the two youngest cohorts respec-
 tively. Thus different identifying assump-
 tions give wildly different inferences
 from the same reduced form (in this
 case, six statistics in Table 3.2). Indeed,
 even the "fact" of the decline depends
 on the identifying assumption; in one
 case it is -1.2 percent and in the other,
 over -3.5 percent.
 Not many studies have taken into ac-
 count the effects of cohort when study-
 ing saving (but see the papers in the
 book edited by Poterba, 1994, for a co-
 hort analysis of saving in the G7 coun-
 tries). Attanasio (1993, 1994) does allow
 for cohort effects in an analysis that uses
 data from the CES. He finds a typical
 hump shaped age-saving profile, albeit
 with positive (median) saving for the el-
 derly. According to Attanasio, during the
 1980s the saving profile of people born
 between 1925 and 1939 shifted down
 (even though the decline in saving could
 also be potentially explained by a general
 shift in the age-saving profile for all co-
 horts). Attanasio also examines the sensi-
 tivity of his estimates to the choice of
 "consumption" and finds that part of the
 overall decline in saving (but not all) can
 be accounted for if durable expenditures
 18 We cannot use the cohort aged 55-64 in
 1972/73 because the eldest group in 1982/85
 includes a group who were older than 64 in
 1972/73.
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 are considered as saving rather than con-
 sumption.
 If the age structure of the U.S. popula-
 tion has not changed much over the past
 20 years, the same cannot be said of
 other demographic factors, such as fam-
 ily composition. The 1980s witnessed an
 increase in one parent households, a de-
 crease in average family size and in the
 number of children, and an increase in
 divorce and family dissolution. Many
 studies exclude "nonstandard" types of
 households but the saving behavior of
 these families can be of importance.
 Avery and Kennickell (1991) show that a
 large share of those who dissave (31.4%)
 is accounted for by households who ex-
 perience a change in family status. James
 Smith (1994) also finds evidence that
 family dissolution has a strong influence
 on saving and wealth accumulation.
 As discussed in Section 3, lone parent
 households have the lowest saving rate in
 the population and there has been a shift
 toward this type of family structure since
 the 1960s. Thus changes in the family
 composition of the population might be a
 candidate for an explanation for the de-
 cline in saving rates. On the other hand,
 the income of these types of families is
 simply too low to have much effect on
 the overall saving rate (see Bosworth,
 Burtless, and Sabelhaus 1991).
 Because a simple CEQ model may not
 be able to account for the recent decline
 in saving, we next examine whether ex-
 planations connected to the precaution-
 ary saving motive are better suited to ex-
 plain the empirical findings. As we will
 see later, it is not easy to test for the
 presence of a precautionary saving mo-
 tive. Furthermore, it is sometimes diffi-
 cult to draw a clear-cut distinction be-
 tween precautionary saving and other
 motives. Thus, we provide hereafter only
 some informal discussion on the poten-
 tial relevance of the precautionary saving
 motive.
 Some authors argue that programs
 such as Medicare and Medicaid have de-
 creased the need to provide for emer-
 gencies. The extent to which the popula-
 tion is insured against the need for large
 medical expenditure has increased dra-
 matically since 1950 (see Summers and
 Carroll 1987). It is also possible that im-
 proved disability and life insurance cov-
 erage has reduced the extent of precau-
 tionary saving. The importance of these
 factors is also shown in simulations of
 models which ifnclude a precautionary
 saving motive (see Hubbard, Skinner,
 and Zeldes 1995). Skinner (1990) pro-
 vides some evidence in favor of a decline
 in precautionary saving during the 1980s.
 Another aspect of the precautionary mo-
 tive is the well documented increase in
 female labor participation. The potential
 income insurance provided inside the
 household when there is more than one
 earner could lead to a reduction in pre-
 cautionary saving. Summers and Carroll
 (1987) consider this, but do not find evi-
 dence that two-earner families have con-
 tributed to the decline in saving.
 Another important factor to consider
 is the distribution of income. In Section
 3 we documented that it is high income
 households who are doing most of the
 saving. The shift in the income distri-
 bution toward increasing inequality
 might be expected to have increased the
 saving rate so that the decline net of this
 would have been greater. Bosworth,
 Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) examine
 the decline in saving across income
 classes and show that there is a uniform
 decline in saving across income quintiles.
 In fact, one of their main findings is that
 the saving rates of most population sub-
 groups change in parallel over time. This
 suggests that the decline in saving must
 involve one or more factors that affect
 the great majority of households uni-
 formly. They mention that one possible
 explanation for lower saving may involve
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 slower income growth. Traditional life
 cycle models cannot explain this positive
 correlation between aggregate income
 growth and individual saving rates (see
 Carroll and David Weil 1994). Carroll,
 Jody Overland, and Weil (1994) propose
 a model that includes habit formation
 (an "improvement motive" to use
 Keynes' terminology) to provide an ex-
 planation for the relation between saving
 and income growth and to potentially ex-
 plain the decline in saving. This issue de-
 serves more attention and more empiri-
 cal work to be fully understood.
 There are other explanations related
 to the distribution of income. In particu-
 lar, the income of the elderly has in-
 creased substantially relative to that of
 the rest of the population. The primary
 cause of this improvement has been the
 dramatic increase in social security bene-
 fits (see Summers and Carroll 1987; and
 Hurd 1990). Insofar as this represents a
 transfer to a group with a low propensity
 to save it may be a partial explanation of
 any saving rate decline. The most dra-
 matic imputation along these lines is due
 to Jagadeesh Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and
 Sabelhaus (1995) who estimate that if
 the government had not redistributed
 resources toward older people (from
 younger people and future generations)
 then the saving rate would have been
 three times as large as it actually is. As
 already discussed, this style of explana-
 tion does not require that behavior (sav-
 ing rates) change at the household level
 to generate changes in the aggregate
 rate. Although plausible, this still leaves
 as an open question why the saving rates
 for younger households also fell.
 Apart from income, wealth is another
 important economic variable to consider
 when examining the decline in saving.
 For example, one can ask whether the
 big capital gains on housing and stock
 prices have led to a decrease in saving.
 There are a few studies on this issue.
 Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus
 (1991) documented, for example, that
 the decline in saving was higher for
 homeowners than for renters. Using the
 PSID, Skinner (1989, 1993) finds a small
 negative impact of increases in house
 values on saving. Hilary Hoynes and
 Daniel McFadden (1994) look at the
 same question as Skinner (1993) but
 come to different conclusions. Unfortu-
 nately, their sample selection and the
 variables under consideration are differ-
 ent so that is difficult to identify the
 source of the different conclusions. They
 find a statistically significant but very
 small increase rather than a decrease in
 the saving rate consequent on an in-
 crease in real house prices. However, in
 other specifications they find much
 larger (positive) effects. Engelhardt
 (1995) finds results which are more in
 line with the Skinner (1993) estimates.
 However, he splits the gains in housing
 price into positive and negative capital
 gains and shows that it is only the nega-
 tive gains that are related to saving.
 Therefore only people who experienced
 negative capital gains saved more, while
 the households who experienced positive
 capital gains did not change their saving.
 This work does not support the hypothe-
 sis that the decline in saving can be ex-
 plained by the gains in the housing mar-
 ket.
 As far as bonds and stocks are con-
 cerned, both Bosworth, Burtless, and Sa-
 belhaus (1991) and Avery and Kennickell
 (1991) show that savings are higher
 among bonds and equity holders who
 represent about 30 percent of the popu-
 lation. Although the stock exchange mar-
 ket collapsed in 1987, the S&P Stock In-
 dex between 1983 and 1989 increased at
 a rate of 11.7 percent per year. There
 are only two studies which examine the
 effects of capital gains on stocks for sav-
 ing. Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus
 (1991) found that the decline in the sav-
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 ing rate is actually smaller among bonds
 and stockholders than it is among house-
 holds with no marketable financial as-
 sets. Similarly, Attanasio (1993) does not
 find any evidence that these capital gains
 have decreased saving.
 Another potentially important change
 in the composition of wealth that has
 been explored in the literature is the re-
 markable increase in the annuitization of
 household wealth in the 1980s. To pre-
 sent just a few figures, Social Security
 benefits represent almost ten percent of
 U.S. personal income compared to only
 four percent in the 1960s. In 1962, nine
 percent of elderly Americans received
 income from private pensions; by 1988
 this figure had risen to 29 percent. Also,
 while pension plans in the past repre-
 sented only 5.2 percent of U.S. house-
 hold net wealth, by 1990 they repre-
 sented 16.5 percent (see Auerbach,
 Kotlikoff, and Weil 1992; and Auerbach
 et al. 1995). A larger share of annuitized
 resources may imply both a decreasing
 bequest motive (strictly, a reduced risk
 of accidental bequest) and a reduced
 precautionary motive (to allow for mor-
 tality risk) and hence higher consump-
 tion. According to Auerbach, Kotlikoff,
 and Weil (1992), while increased annuiti-
 zation cannot explain all of the recent
 decline in the U.S. saving rate, it may
 represent an important piece of the puz-
 zle. This explanation is again consistent
 with the evidence that saving has de-
 clined more for the older households.
 There are also other "composition of
 wealth" effects that deserve mention. A
 number of authors have suggested that
 the cash payouts to share owners associ-
 ated with corporate restructuring could
 be a factor explaining the decline in pri-
 vate saving (see, among others, Summers
 and Carroll 1987; George Hatsopoulos,
 Paul Krugman, and Poterba 1989; and
 Bernheim 1991). Summers and Carroll
 (1987) mention, for example, that in
 1985 corporate share repurchases totaled
 $27.3 billion and cash payments to share-
 holders in companies that were taken
 over totaled $94.8 billion. Share repur-
 chases and takeovers resulted in a flow
 of income equal to four percent of dis-
 posable income from the corporate to
 the household sector. If households con-
 sumed 50 percent of these payouts, the
 personal and private saving rates would
 have fallen between one and two per-
 cent. The problem with this explanation
 is that the pattern of declining saving is
 common to the young and people in the
 lower part of the income distribution
 who are unlikely to be receiving take-
 overs premiums or interest on junk bonds.
 Other authors have noted that an im-
 portant change in the 1980s was the de-
 velopment of financial markets and the
 potential lessening of financial con-
 straints such as liquidity and downpay-
 ment constraints. The sharp increase in
 consumer credit relative to income in
 the 1980s suggests that households may
 need to do less saving before major pur-
 chases. Summers and Carroll (1987)
 show that the average down payment for
 first time homeowners has decreased
 substantially. Also households have taken
 up increasing amounts of debt, as is
 documented in Kennickell and Janice
 Shack-Marquez (1992) and Glenn Can-
 ner and Charles Luckett (1991). Some
 indirect evidence in support of this argu-
 ment can be obtained by examining the
 evidence on mortgages (see Joyce Man-
 chester and Poterba 1989). In a pair of
 papers, Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pa-
 gano (1989, 1994) have shown that con-
 sumption in Italy is affected by capital
 market imperfections. For example, they
 document that the excess sensitivity of
 consumption to current income across
 countries can be attributed to the char-
 acteristics of capital markets, in particu-
 lar to the wedge between the borrowing
 and lending rates, downpayment ratios,
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 the size of the consumer credit market
 and other indicators of liquidity con-
 straints, and an inability to borrow. If
 households cannot borrow the desired
 amount, then aggregate net saving will
 be higher than in the presence of perfect
 capital markets. Another useful applica-
 tion of these ideas can be found in
 Guiso, Jappelli, and Daniele Terlizzese
 (1991, 1994).
 This explanation of the decline has
 testable predictions. If liquidity or down-
 payment constraints are important, then
 only certain age groups should be af-
 fected. Everything else being equal, t'he
 removal of constraints should decrease
 the saving rate of the young, while the
 saving of people close to retirement
 should not be affected by the removal of
 these types of market imperfections. As
 we have seen, however, the decline in
 the saving rate in the U.S. is greater for
 older households than for younger ones.
 All of these explanations of the decline
 in saving rates can be captured in vari-
 ants of the standard model. Some
 authors doubt that any of these explana-
 tions (individually or jointly) can provide
 an adequate account of the decline and
 conclude that it is necessary to resort to
 other (psychological) explanations (see
 Bernheim 1991; and Richard Thaler
 1994). We shall discuss this approach at
 length in Section 7; for now we present
 some of the ideas that are relevant in the
 present context. For Bernheim (1991,
 1994b), proponents of the psychological
 paradigm can better identify several fac-
 tors that contributed to the decline in
 saving. One factor that economic psy-
 chology emphasizes is the impact of per-
 sonal experience on expectations. For ex-
 ample, generations born after the Great
 Depression seem to be less worried
 about financial security and therefore
 less inclined to save. As economic hard-
 ship promotes conservatism, prosperity
 fosters extravagance. It is noteworthy
 that the unprecedented decline in saving
 has coincided with the longest peacetime
 expansion on record. Bernheim (1991)
 suggests that these years of prosperity
 may have created a (false) sense of secu-
 rity. This explanation rests on the im-
 plicit assumption that it is changes in co-
 hort behavior that have led to the
 decline. As seen above it is by no means
 certain that this is the case.
 Proponents of the psychological para-
 digm also point to changes in the compo-
 sition of income and wealth as explana-
 tions for the low rate of saving. But their
 rationale is in sharp contrast with the
 "economic" explanations previously men-
 tioned. According to the psychological
 paradigm, some types of income are
 more "spendable" than others (see Hersh
 Shefrin and Thaler 1988). Individuals
 may have difficulty resisting the tempta-
 tion to spend unless they have to take
 explicit steps in order to access income.
 As a result, they may save a very small
 fraction of items like interest income but
 a very large fraction of undistributed
 corporate profits. In the 1980s personal
 interest income rose dramatically as a
 percentage of private disposable income,
 while there was a 20 year decline in un-
 distributed corporate profits, followed by
 a slight upturn in the late 1980s (see
 Bernheim 1991). Furthermore, investors
 swapped huge amounts of corporate eq-
 uity for debt. As mentioned before, in
 the 1980s there was a wave of leverage
 buyout activity and a growing tendency
 for companies to repurchase shares.
 When stockholders tender their shares in
 a buyout or a repurchase agreement,
 they convert wealth to cash, at least tem-
 porarily. From a psychological perspec-
 tive, the conversion shifts resources be-
 tween "mental accounts." In particular,
 it transforms wealth into cash and inves-
 tors may well be tempted to consume at
 least a portion of the proceeds. As be-
 fore, this style of explanation has prob-
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 lems in explaining the widespread
 change in saving rates.
 Changes in the aggregate saving rate
 over time constitute an important chal-
 lenge for any model of saving. A "satis-
 factory" model of saving will need to ex-
 plain not only cross-sectional behavior
 but also changes over time. In this sec-
 tion we have reviewed a number of pa-
 pers that were motivated by the decline
 in the U.S. saving rate. Although we have
 learnt a good deal about saving behavior
 from these studies it remains to make a
 judgment as to whether they have helped
 us to understand the decline itself.
 In evaluating the different explana-
 tions, two aspects of the saving decline
 deserve emphasis. First, there is the
 abruptness of the change in the aggre-
 gate series in the mid-1980s. Second,
 there is the fact that however we stratify
 the data (by age, income, shareholding,
 etc.) there seems to be evidence of a de-
 cline across diverse groups; albeit with
 different changes for different groups.
 These two facts seem to rule out most of
 the explanations given above. Some op-
 erate over too long a time period and do
 not show evidence of any sharp change
 in the mid-1980s. Others would imply
 changes in only some subgroups. Thus it
 is our belief that we are still some way
 from having a convincing explanation of
 the saving decline. This is reflected in
 the fragmented discussion given above.
 To develop an adequate explanation
 we need to identify more precisely the
 determinants of saving and consumption
 at the household level. This requires the
 specification and testing of specific mod-
 els. It is to this that we now turn.
 5. Empirical Results on Short-Run
 Intertemporal Allocation
 5.1 Econometric Issues
 As discussed in Section 2, most em-
 pirical work on intertemporal allocation
 using micro data has concentrated on the
 Euler equation for allocation between
 different periods. Thus we devote a good
 deal of space to this empirical work. In
 this subsection we discuss the econo-
 metric issues that arise in estimating
 Euler equations and in the following
 subsection we present some of the re-
 sults. In Subsection 5.3 we present a
 discussion of the empirical evidence
 that focuses specifically on the precau-
 tionary motive. Although important, the
 implications for the Euler equation do
 not exhaust the predictions of the stan-
 dard model; in Section 5.4 we consider
 tests of some other implications of the
 model.
 There are a number of issues for
 modeling Euler equations. The issues we
 discuss here are: whether to model
 consumption or saving; the choice of
 functional form; the use of approxima-
 tions to the Euler equation; dealing with
 the unobservability of consumption
 shock variances; the choice of goods to
 model; how to handle differences be-
 tween the information sets of agents and
 econometricians; the stochastic specifi-
 cation and measurement error and the
 length of the sample period.
 The first issue is whether to model
 consumption or saving. Most studies on
 the micro data choose to model con-
 sumption. This is either because the the-
 ory underlying the analysis is a theory of
 consumption or because a saving mea-
 sure is not available or is deemed too
 noisy. As discussed in the last section,
 few panel data sets have wealth mea-
 sures or good information on consump-
 tion and income. Moreover, even if
 wealth data is available, we need to first
 difference to derive saving so it is likely
 to be noisier than consumption. For evi-
 dence on this issue, see Attanasio (1993),
 Marjorie Flavin (1991), and Alessie and
 Lusardi (1993) who all have recourse to
 robust estimation.
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 The next issue involves functional
 form. This has generally been treated
 in an ad hoc way. The usual choice is
 the iso-elastic (CRRA) form. It is not
 completely clear why this is, because
 the CRRA form has some shortcomings.
 The principal of these is that the in-
 tertemporal substitution elasticity is
 constrained, a priori, to be independent
 of wealth (that is, it is the same for rich
 and poor) and there is only one parame-
 ter to control for intertemporal alloca-
 tion (or risk aversion) and prudence.
 Among the criteria that should guide
 the choice of functional form are: con-
 gruence with theory (we should be able
 to impose theoretical restrictions in a
 simple way); flexibility (for example, im-
 portant elasticities should not be con-
 strained to be constant); and econo-
 metric tractability (for example, linearity
 in parameters is desirable). The usual ap-
 proach to choosing a functional form is
 to choose a (one good) utility function
 and then to differentiate it to give the
 marginal utility of money. In Attanasio
 and Browning (1995) an alternative ap-
 proach is adopted: a tractable and flexi-
 ble Euler equation is chosen directly. If
 desired, this can be integrated back
 to the utility function. This procedure
 allows these authors to find a simple
 functional form that nests the CRRA
 form and avoids the two problems men-
 tioned above. Attanasio and Browning
 (1995) find that the CRRA is decisively
 rejected against the more general alter-
 native.
 The next issue involves the choice of
 whether to estimate exact or approxi-
 mate Euler equations. The theory states
 that the marginal utility of expenditure is
 a martingale; thus an exact approach
 would derive the marginal utility of ex-
 penditure and then first difference. If we
 choose the CRRA form, from (2.1) and
 (2.2) we have (ignoring demographics for
 the moment):
 3(1 + rt) (Ct+1)- - (Ct)= et+,
 where Et(et+i) = 0. (5.1)
 There are two major problems with esti-
 mating this. First, it is nonlinear in pa-
 rameters. This is not too much of a prob-
 lem; much more serious is that C is
 likely to be measured with error and we
 have no satisfactory way of dealing with
 measurement error in nonlinear equa-
 tions. These considerations have led in-
 vestigators to use the approximation
 given in (2.4):
 AlnCt+1 = 1 + rt + 0.50yt2+1 + Ut+1
 where Et(ut+1) = 0. (5.2)
 This is linear in parameters and mea-
 surement error in consumption can be
 readily dealt with. The problem with this
 approximation is that it has introduced a
 new (unobservable) variable, ay+1, into
 the analysis.
 The inclusion of the variance term in
 (5.2) seems to give considerable prob-
 lems (see Subsection 5.3 below) so it is
 tempting to use the exact form and avoid
 these problems. If we can overcome the
 nonlinear measurement error problem,
 the exact approach with a CRRA form
 gives the same information about behav-
 ior as approximations even if the latter
 includes some valid proxy for the con-
 sumption shock variance. This is because
 the parameter y governs both intertem-
 poral substitution and prudence; from an
 estimate of y we can predict the reaction
 to an increase in 6T+1. Of course, the ad-
 dition of a valid proxy for this variance
 may give more precise estimates if the
 restriction on the coefficients in (5.2) is
 not rejected but formally estimates from
 the exact form give all the information
 concerning saving behavior. Our own
 feeling is that this comes dangerously
 close to identifying precautionary saving
 off of functional form (specifically the
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 imposition of the CRRA form) and is not
 robust. This is compounded by the fact
 that the y parameter is not usually pre-
 cisely estimated.
 The next issue we discuss is the choice
 of good to model. This is often forced on
 us by data. For example, the PSID has
 two food expenditures ("food at home"
 and "food outside the home"; but see
 Skinner, 1987, for a more ambitious at-
 tempt to use other information in the
 PSID). The U.S. CES and the U.K. FES
 have much wider and more reliable mea-
 sures of consumption but very little
 panel aspect (in fact, none for the FES).
 A minimum preferred set of measures
 would be for the purchases of nondur-
 ables and stocks of durables. While the
 latter may be possible for cars, it is not
 for other durables.19 In fact, though, in-
 vestigators usually take what is given and
 assume additivity of any goods to hand
 from all other goods.
 Most widely used additive separability
 assumptions are dubious at best. It is dif-
 ficult to believe that preferences over
 nondurables are separable from the
 stock of durables. For example, the latter
 depends on car ownership and gas and
 bus expenditures are included in nondur-
 ables. It seems a priori incredible that
 preferences as between gas and bus ex-
 penditures should be independent of car
 ownership. Similar remarks apply to
 housing and, say, heating expenditures.
 As far as we are aware there is no sys-
 tematic discussion anywhere of the likely
 biases that ignoring nonseparabilities
 may induce in estimates of the Euler
 equation.
 For some purposes it may be sufficient
 to observe only a single good, even if this
 is not separable from other goods. For
 example, to test the over-identifying re-
 strictions we need include only the
 changes in discounted prices of all goods
 in the (Frisch or X-constant) demand
 function for the good we observe. Al-
 though this justification for ignoring
 other goods may be valid for nondur-
 ables and some durables (if we include
 the user cost of the latter), it will not
 hold for other important "goods" such as
 housing or labor supply. For these there
 is no price that we can plausibly include
 on the right hand side of the Euler equa-
 tion that will pick up the effects of these
 goods.20
 Because the PSID has only food ex-
 penditures it is worth spending some
 time examining this specific case. There
 are two problems with the food measure
 in the PSID. The first is how noisy it is.
 Thus David Runkle (1991) estimates that
 76 percent of the between year variation
 in food expenditures is noise.21 The sec-
 ond problem is that it is ambiguous as to
 what period the food measures in the
 PSID cover. This presents problems for
 the timing of the arrival of new informa-
 tion. The question is formulated as fol-
 lows: "How much do you spend on food
 in an average week?" Responses are col-
 lected in the Spring and they may per-
 tain to the first quarter of the interview
 year or to the past year. This is not a
 trivial issue given the importance of tim-
 ing the instruments correctly and of
 knowing precisely the information set.
 A far better measure of consumption
 would be expenditure on nondurables in
 a given period. Unfortunately there is
 very little panel data that has such infor-
 mation. For developed countries the
 only panel data sets we are aware of are
 for Japan and the U.S. (both four quar-
 19 Even in surveys where the ownership of par-
 ticular durable goods is recorded, the actual value
 of these is not.
 20 The use of the discounted marginal wage
 (even if available for all adult members of the
 household) has the usual problem that it relies too
 strongly on the life-cycle model of labor supply
 with spot markets to be widely acceptable.
 21In an unpublished paper, Matthew Shapiro
 (1982) has the even more alarming estimate of
 95%.
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 ters; see Hayashi, 1985, for results on
 the Japanese data set) and Norway and
 Spain (both eight quarters; see Knut
 Mork and V. Kerry Smith 1989; and
 Browning and Dolores Collado 1994, re-
 spectively). Although these panels are
 likely to be informative, their limited du-
 ration reduces their usefulness. This is
 particularly the case for the four quarter
 surveys because the longer surveys sug-
 gest that there are important seasonal ef-
 fects in consumption and income pro-
 cesses.
 One way to circumvent the lack of
 long panels with reliable and full con-
 sumption information is to use long time
 series of expenditure surveys to con-
 struct quasi-panel (or "cohort mean" or
 "synthetic panel") data (see Browning,
 Deaton, and Margaret Irish 1985). This
 method follows the same cohort over
 time by taking means of variables for,
 say, 30 year olds in one year and 31 year
 olds in the next year and then treating
 these means as panel data observations
 on the same "individual." These quasi-
 panels have some advantages over true
 panels. For example, we can construct
 very long panels (over 20 years for the
 U.K.) with no attrition. There is also less
 measurement error than in the PSID and
 averaging takes some of that away. On
 the other hand, small cell sizes reintro-
 duce measurement error in the form of
 sampling error (consumption and income
 are correlated in cross-section even if
 the CEQ model holds). It is also the case
 that some dynamic processes cannot be
 modeled with quasi-panels (see Robert
 Moffitt 1993).
 If we do have data on many goods (as
 in quasi-panels, for example) and wish to
 model consumption rather than individ-
 ual (constant-k or Frisch) demands then
 we need to be clear how consumption is
 defined. This is relatively straightfor-
 ward: some measure of total expenditure
 on many goods, denoted x, is taken and
 then it is divided by some price index,
 denoted P(p) where p is the price vector
 for the many goods available in the pe-
 riod. The result is "consumption." The
 conditions under which this procedure is
 valid (which are much weaker than
 within period homotheticity) are given in
 William Gorman (1959).22
 The next issue we consider is that the
 information set of econometrician and
 agent obviously differ. If we follow the
 usual practice and assume that agents
 know everything available to the econo-
 metrician then any lagged variable ob-
 served by the econometrician is a valid
 instrument. The problem that arises is
 that while the agent may know every-
 thing the econometrician does (at least,
 about the agent's variables) the econo-
 metrician may not know very much that
 is of relevance for the agent. This will
 lead to a lack of power in tests of the
 over-identifying restrictions that are the
 main vehicle for testing the predictions
 of the model. The other problem that
 may arise is the exact opposite of this:
 the investigator may use information that
 was not a part of the agent's information
 set (see Pischke 1995). In this case the
 instruments may not be orthogonal to in-
 dividual consumption changes.
 We turn now to the stochastic specifi-
 cation. A major part of this is the ac-
 counting for heterogeneity. To see how
 we handle this, consider again equation
 (2.4). Apart from the need to allow for
 changes in demographics we can also al-
 low that the discount factor and the in-
 tertemporal substitution elasticity vary
 across agents. Finally, we might want to
 include a person specific fixed effect in
 the discount factor. This has the virtue
 of absorbing any fixed part of the (unob-
 servable) consumption variance term.
 22 See Richard Blundell, Browning, and Costas
 Meghir (1994) for an empirical demonstration that
 the choice of price index in this context does not
 much matter.
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 The drawback of including fixed effects
 is that we loose efficiency if the fixed
 effects are not required and we have to
 be much more careful about exogeneity.
 In particular, we cannot use a "within"
 estimator because the instruments are
 not strongly exogenous (see Michael
 Keane and Runkle 1992). Finally, we can
 allow for white noise taste shocks, while
 recognizing that this induces an MA(1)
 structure into the error term which in-
 validates the use of once lagged instru-
 ments.
 As already discussed, most of the vari-
 ables used in an Euler equation are
 likely to be subject to considerable mea-
 surement error. Multiplicative measure-
 ment error in the consumption measure
 used in (5.2) invalidates once lagged con-
 sumption growth as an instrument (but
 not necessarily other once lagged vari-
 ables which are orthogonal to measure-
 ment error on consumption). The prob-
 lem with dropping this instrument is the
 usual one: we lose power. On the other
 hand, the results of Joseph Altonji and
 Aloysius Siow (1987), Julie Nelson
 (1994), and Lusardi (1996) suggest
 strongly that not taking serious account
 of measurement error can lead to bias.
 Generally, because the use of twice
 lagged instruments allows us to take care
 of measurement error, white noise taste
 shocks, and time aggregation all at once,
 dropping once lagged instruments seems
 like a very sensible precaution if identifi-
 cation can be achieved without them.
 Finally we come to the issue of the
 sample period. As discussed in Gary
 Chamberlain (1984) the orthogonality
 conditions apply across time for each in-
 dividual and not across agents. Thus the
 usual asymptotic results only hold as the
 number of time periods in the panel be-
 come large. As the discussion in Randall
 Mariger and Kathryn Shaw (1993) and
 Deaton (1992) makes clear, if the panel
 used is short then the usual orthogonal-
 ity conditions will not hold if there are
 common (macro) shocks23 and these im-
 pact on different households in different
 ways. Although there is no strict answer
 to how long a panel needs to be it seems
 that a minimum of, say, two business cy-
 cles (15 years) is desirable. If this is the
 case, then this invalidates most Euler
 equation studies except for those that
 use (long) quasi-panels.
 5.2 Euler Equation Estimates and Tests
 There have been a great number of
 Euler equation consumption studies over
 the past few years; in Table 5.1 we list 25
 such studies that have used micro data
 from various developed countries. There
 is a wide variety in the specifications
 used in these papers. As evidence of this,
 in Columns 2 to 6 we present the data
 set; the sample period; the utility func-
 tion used; a list of controls for taste
 shifters; and the consumption measure
 used. There are also other important dif-
 ferences in specification (for example,
 the inclusion of a fixed effect) which it is
 difficult to tabulate but which must be
 kept in mind.
 Although most investigators have some
 discussion of their substantive findings it
 is the case that almost everyone concen-
 trates on the implications of their results
 for the validity of the standard additive
 model. The generic test is the test of the
 over-identifying restrictions from the or-
 thogonality condition. One problem with
 it is that it may have low power. Thus
 most investigators seek to enhance the
 power of their tests by concentrating on
 specific alternatives to the standard addi-
 tive model.
 Of these more focused tests, the one
 23 Many studies account for the effect of com-
 mon macro shocks by inserting time dummies in
 the Euler equations. Sumru Altug and Miller
 (1990) provide a rigorous interpretation for this by
 appealing to the restrictions implied by the com-
 plete market assumption.
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 TABLE 5.1
 CONsuMPrION EULER EQUATIONS USING MICRO DATA
 Sample Controls for
 Authors Data Set Period Preferences Taste Shifters
 Hall & Frederic Mishkin PSID 1968-75 Quadratic Age, # of children and adults
 (1982)
 Bemanke (1984) SCF 1967-70 Quadratic Age, # of adults, occupation
 Browning, Deaton, & Irish FES 1970-76 General # children, occupation
 (1985)
 Hayashi (1985) SFC 1981:2- CARA None
 (Japan) 1982:1
 Altonji & Siow (1987) PSID 1968-81 CRRA Age, education, children, area, marital status
 Mork & V. K. Smith (1989) CES 1975-77 Quadratic Age, children, family size
 (Norway)
 Zeldes (1989a) PSID 1968-82 CRRA Age, family size
 Altug & Miller (1990) PSID 1968-83 CRRA Age, size, and sex composition of household
 Maureen Lage (1991) PSID/ 1974-84 Quadratic Age, # of adults & children
 CES
 Emily Lawrence (1991) PSID 1974-82 CRRA Age, family size, race, education
 Runkle (1991) PSID 1973-82 CRRA Age
 Keane & Runkle (1992) PSID 1975-82 CRRA Age
 Attanasio & Weber (1993) FES 1970-86 CRRA # of adults, education, labor supply
 Engen (1993) PSID- 1977-87 CRRA Family size, sex, race
 CES
 Mariger & Shaw (1993) PSID 1968-81 Quadratic Age, # adults, # children
 Meghir & Weber (1993) CES 1980-87 Direct Age, # of adults, # children, race, education,
 translog tenure, area, labor supply
 Attanasio & Browning (1995) FES 1970-86 Generalized Age, # children, family size, labor supply
 CRRA
 Attanasio & Weber (1995) CES 1980-90 CRRA Family size, # children, marital status, labor
 force variables
 Blundell, Browning, & FES 1970-86 General # children, housing tenure, family size,
 Meghir (1994) labor supply
 Janice Eberly (1994) SCF 1983-86 CRRA Family size, # children, marital status, labor
 force participation
 Engelhardt (1996) PSID 1975-87 CRRA Age, family size, marital status, education,
 race
 Garcia, Lusardi, & Ng (1994) CES-PSID 1980-87 CRRA Age, family size
 Jappelli, Pischke, & Nicholas PSID-SCF 1971-86 CRRA Age, # of children, # of adult employment
 Souleles (1995) status
 Shea (1995) PSID 1981-87 CRRA Family composition
 Lusardi (1996) CES- 1980-87 CRRA Age, family size
 PSID
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 Table 5.1 (cont.)
 Consumption Excess Sensitivity Other
 Authors Measures (se) Implications
 Hall & Frederic Mishkin Food 0.200 (0.065)
 (1982)
 Bernanke (1984). Automobile -0.0136 (0.019)
 Browning, Deaton, & Irish Nondurables Reject symmetry with male labor
 (1985) supply
 Hayashi (1985) Seven consumption 0.158 (0.020) Durability of services is substantial
 goods
 Altonji & Siow (1987) Food 0.091 (0.091) Weak evidence of asymmetries
 Mork & V. K. Smith (1989) Five consumption 0.378 (0.151) Food not representative of
 goods consumption
 Zeldes (1989a) Food 0.071* (0.016)
 Altug & Miller (1990) Food Importance of macro shocks &
 nonseparability
 Maureen Lage (1991) Total consumption 0.212 (0.023) Measure of consumption matters
 Emily Lawrence (1991) Food Consumption is Varying time preferences across
 sensitive to households
 income
 Runkle (1991) Food 0.018* (0.015) Measurement error in food
 Keane & Runkle (1992) Food -0.011- (0.008)
 Attanasio & Weber (1993) Nondurables 0.119 (0.145) Aggregation problems
 Engen (1993) Nondurables -0.004- (0.005) Mortality risk is important
 Mariger & Shaw (1993) Food No evidence of Relevance of macro shocks
 excess sensitivity
 Meghir & Weber (1993) Food; transport; No evidence of Test of intertemporal
 services excess sensitivity non-separabilities
 Attanasio & Browning (1995) Nondurables 0.086 (0.073)
 Attanasio & Weber (1995) Food; nondurables 0.100 (0.103) Nonseparability between food &
 nondurables
 Blundell, Browning, & Six consumption 0.545 (0.368) Importance of demographics &
 Meghir (1994) goods labor supply
 Janice Eberly (1994) Automobiles -0.30* (0.15) Evidence of transaction costs
 Engelhardt (1996) Food 0.043 (0.035) Test for down payment constraint
 Garcia, Lusardi, & Ng (1994) Food; Nondurables 0.561 (0.207) Allowance for asymmetry in
 0.284 (0.148) expected income changes
 Jappelli, Pischke, & Nicholas Food 0.012* (0.027)
 Souleles (1995)
 Shea (1995) Food 0.063 (0.785) Allowance for asymmetry in
 2.242 (0.951) expected income changes
 Lusardi (1996) Food; Nondurables 0.368 (0.135) Measurement error in CES
 income
 Data sets-OSUD: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (USA), CES: Consumer Expenditure Survey (USA), SCF:
 Survey of Consumer Finance (USA), FES: Family Expenditure Survey (U.K.), SFC: Survey of Family Consumption
 (Japan). * For the parameter of "excess sensitivity" for lagged income (so that a negative sign signifies excess
 sensitivity); for all other studies the parameter given is for (instrumented) income growth or change (So that a
 positive sign signifies excess sensitivity)
 The two estimates for Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng (1994) refer to constrained and unconstrained groups respectively.
 The two estimates for Shea (1995) correspond to positive and negative expected income growth respectively.
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 that has received the widest attention is
 the possible (partial) correlation be-
 tween realized consumption changes and
 either lagged earnings or predicted
 changes in earnings. In Column 7 of Ta-
 ble 5.1 we present the results of one or
 other of these two (excess sensitivity)24
 tests. Finally, in Column 8 we present
 some of the other implications of the re-
 sults reported.
 As discussed in Section 2 and in the
 previous subsection there are a number
 of specific alternatives that might lead to
 a failure of the orthogonality conditions.
 Some of these are consistent with the
 standard additive model: nonseparability
 of the good modeled from labor supply
 or housing; using the approximate Euler
 equation without taking account of the
 error variance term-see equation (5.2)
 above; the use of the wrong functional
 form; the use of instruments that were
 not in the agents' information set; the
 exclusion of predictable variables that do
 affect consumption (for example,
 changes in demographics or the real
 rate); or the use of inappropriately short
 panels. Alternatively it may be that the
 orthogonality conditions fail because
 some assumption of the standard model
 is wrong. For example, there may be in-
 tertemporal nonadditivities in prefer-
 ences (due to habits or durability); li-
 quidity constraints; the existence of
 some groups whose members simply
 spend a fixed proportion of current in-
 come ("rule of thumb" behavior) or seri-
 ally correlated taste changes.
 There are two issues here. First, do
 the orthogonality conditions fail? Sec-
 ond, if they do fail, what are the implica-
 tions of this failure? It will be clear from
 the list given in the previous paragraph
 that even if we do observe failures of the
 orthogonality conditions, the standard
 additive model has a number of "life
 belts" that may save it from drowning.
 This is not to suggest that the standard
 additive model is correct but rather that
 testing for its validity is a good deal more
 difficult than is often supposed.
 To develop a specific alternative, we
 start with what is far and away the most
 widely questioned assumption used in
 the standard additive model: the absence
 of liquidity constraints. Two closely re-
 lated approaches have been used to de-
 rive observable implications of the pres-
 ence of liquidity constraints. The first
 derivation can be used if we have infor-
 mation on asset levels. To illustrate this
 we consider the influential study of
 Zeldes (1989a) which provides what is
 probably the most widely cited Euler
 equation evidence against the model that
 assumes perfect capital markets. Zeldes
 actually provides three tests of which the
 first is considered the most telling. In
 this test he splits his sample into those
 with high and low assets at the beginning
 of the period25 and then includes lagged
 income levels in each of the Euler equa-
 tions for each group. He finds that the
 lagged income term is only significant
 for the low asset group.26 This exempli-
 fies two important features of the analy-
 sis. First, the splitting into groups on the
 24 The term was first used by Flavin (1981) in
 the context of a CEQ model; we use it here to
 refer to a more general failure of the model.
 25 Splitting by asset levels is not the only way to
 split the sample. For example, Jappelli (1990) uses
 data from the Survey of Consumer Finances on
 credit refusal or being a discouraged borrower. He
 finds that not only financial assets or wealth, but
 also age, race, family size, marital status, and in-
 come are important determinants of being refused
 credit or being a discouraged borrower. John
 Caskey and Andrew Peterson (1994) also indicate
 that demographics may be important indicators of
 being constrained.
 26 It should be noted that the validity of this
 empirical finding is not universally accepted. For
 example, Zeldes allows for a fixed effect by includ-
 ing person specific dummies. This is not valid if
 the instruments are predetermined but not strictly
 exogenous, see Keane and Runkle (1992). They
 show that using an alternative (consistent) estima-
 tor leads to quite different qualitative results con-
 cerning excess sensitivity.
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 basis of beginning of period assets raises
 the power of the test; if we pooled both
 groups then the coefficient on lagged in-
 come would be "less significant." The
 test also facilitates identification: Zeldes
 (1989a, p. 322) remarks that "it seems
 unlikely that [a failure of assumptions
 not connected with liquidity constraints]
 would lead to a rejection for low-asset
 consumers but not for high-asset con-
 sumers.
 The standard additive model is, how-
 ever, not so easily disposed of. As Carroll
 (1992, 1993) notes, such an outcome
 might well be expected even if there are
 no liquidity constraints. If there is a pre-
 cautionary motive then we should in-
 clude a variance term in the Euler equa-
 tion; see equation (5.2). This variance
 term is small for those with high assets.
 Among those with low assets, however,
 agents who have low income (relative to
 their "permanent" income) will have a
 higher variance and hence will have
 higher consumption growth (on average).
 This leads to a negative correlation be-
 tween lagged income and consumption
 growth for this group which is exactly
 what Zeldes observes. Similar remarks
 can be made for the other two tests of
 Zeldes. Thus Carroll accepts the rejec-
 tion of the over-identifying restrictions
 but infers from this that there is a sig-
 nificant precautionary motive rather than
 that some agents are liquidity con-
 strained.
 If asset levels are not observed then
 we may have recourse to the test which
 includes instrumented earnings growth
 in the Euler equation. Because this is a
 function of lagged variables (and any
 current variables that are perfectly an-
 ticipated) it should be uncorrelated with
 consumption growth. As can be seen
 from the number of unstarred coeffi-
 cients in Column 7 of Table 5.1 this test
 has been used very widely.
 A study of Table 5.1 suggests that
 there is no consensus at all on whether
 there is excess sensitivity. Just about the
 same number of studies find evidence of
 it as do not. It is frustrating in the ex-
 treme that we have very little idea of
 what gives rise to the different findings.
 Mariger and Shaw (1993) give some indi-
 cations for papers estimating CEQ mod-
 els on the PSID but we still await a study
 which traces all of the sources of differ-
 ences in conclusions to sample period;
 sample selection; functional form; vari-
 able definition; demographic controls;
 econometric technique; stochastic speci-
 fication; instrument definition; etc.
 Studies that use quasi-panel data gen-
 erally do not find evidence of excess sen-
 sitivity. Attanasio and Browning (1995)
 present evidence that this is more be-
 cause these studies treat demographics
 and labor supply satisfactorily than be-
 cause of differences in the data set. Us-
 ing Euler equations that do not control
 adequately for demographics they find
 evidence of excess sensitivity. However,
 including controls for demographics and
 age or labor supply this evidence disap-
 pears. Because income, labor supply, and
 demographics are all correlated over the
 life cycle it is no surprise that allowing
 for the latter two reduces the importance
 of the former. Thus the results of At-
 tanasio and Browning (1995) are better
 thought of as showing how difficult it is
 to find convincing tests for excess sensi-
 tivity rather than as evidence for or
 against any particular variant of the stan-
 dard model.
 One important feature of Column 7 of
 Table 5.1 is that almost all studies find
 that the expected income growth (or
 lagged income) variable has the "pre-
 dicted" sign (that is, expected income
 growth has a positive coefficient and
 lagged income a negative one).27 Even
 27 And the two that find the "wrong" sign Ben
 Bernanke (1984) and Runkle (1991)-have low
 t-values.
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 though many of these studies use the
 same data set, this seems somewhat un-
 likely if there is no excess sensitivity.28
 This suggests that the insignificant find-
 ings are the result of low power rather
 than a nonrejection of the orthogonality
 conditions. There is also other evidence
 that many tests of excess sensitivity may
 have low power. Very few studies pre-
 sent measures of fit for the auxiliary
 equation used to predict income growth
 but those that do (Altonji and Siow 1987;
 Lusardi 1996; and Attanasio and
 Guglielmo Weber 1995) report very low
 R2's. In the three cases where authors
 take especial care to increase the predic-
 tive power of the income growth equa-
 tion (Lusardi 1996; John Shea 1995; and
 Rene Garcia, Lusardi, and Serena Ng
 1994) the investigators do find evidence
 of excess sensitivity.29
 One other tentative conclusion for
 modeling that emerges from the studies
 cited in Table 5.1 is the importance of
 allowing for measurement error. The pa-
 pers that account for measurement error
 (for example, Altonji and Siow 1987; and
 Runkle 1991) do not find evidence of ex-
 cess sensitivity. However, this may sim-
 ply be because allowing for measure-
 ment error further reduces the power of
 the test for excess sensitivity.
 Although they are not conclusive, sup-
 pose that we do take the results pre-
 sented in Table 5.1 to indicate that there
 is excess sensitivity. As we have dis-
 cussed at length, the inference to be
 drawn from this is not obvious. One pos-
 sible source of identification is to note
 that there is an asymmetry in the re-
 sponse of consumption growth to ex-
 pected income growth if there are liquid-
 ity constraints but not if consumers use a
 "rule of thumb." If income growth is ex-
 pected to be negative then liquidity con-
 strained agents can smooth by saving. It
 is only when income growth is expected
 to be positive that consumers may find
 themselves constrained and hence hav-
 ing to set consumption changes equal to
 income changes. Thus we could allow for
 nonlinear effects of expected income
 growth (for example, by including posi-
 tive and negative income growth as sepa-
 rate regressors; see Shea 1995; and Gar-
 cia, Lusardi, and Ng 1994) and test for
 linearity. Note, however, that Shea al-
 lows for asymmetric effects but finds the
 exact opposite of the prediction from a
 model with liquidity constraints.
 As an example of identification that
 uses a somewhat more structural ap-
 proach, Meghir and Weber (1993) pro-
 vide a test that allows us to discriminate
 between liquidity constraints and in-
 tertemporal preference dependencies.
 Because both these departures from the
 basic model give that lagged consump-
 tion behavior influences current con-
 sumption it is not clear how we can de-
 cide between them on the basis of a test
 that uses the latter. Rather than looking
 at total consumption, Meghir and Weber
 exploit the differential impact of these
 two departures on the structure of de-
 mand. Broadly, liquidity constraints may
 affect the allocation of total expenditure
 to a period but they should not affect the
 dispersal of this total over different
 goods. On the other hand, habits will
 lead to different effects of past demands
 28 Note, however, that this could be due to pub-
 lication censoring: investigators who find the
 "wrong" sign may continue with specification
 searches until they have the "right" sign.
 29Another response to the low power is to use
 data that give large and observable income shocks.
 Thus Browning and Crossley (1995) use a large
 sample of unemployed workers to investigate the
 sensitivity of expenditures to Unemployment In-
 surance (UI) benefits. The reasoning here is that
 the unemployed are likely to have current income
 that is befow "permanent" income and are also un-
 likely to be able to borrow from conventional
 sources. If this group is not liquidity constrained
 then it seems unlikely that anyone will be. These
 authors find that only those who had no liquid as-
 sets at their job loss are sensitive to the level of UI
 benefits.
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 on the current structure of demand,
 even when we condition on total expen-
 diture.30 In the event, they do not find
 significant evidence of either habits or of
 liquidity constraints.
 In the end, the results on the validity
 of the standard additive model from con-
 sumption Euler equations are deeply
 ambiguous. Given Table 5.1, it is not dif-
 ficult to find evidence to cite for or
 against the standard additive model (or
 even the additive CEQ model). Some
 would argue that there is no strong evi-
 dence of nonorthogonality. Others would
 allow that there is, but this is consistent
 with the standard additive model. Even
 for those who do not take these views,
 there may still be disagreement about
 which of the standard additive assump-
 tions are failing. Thus these results are
 such that no one coming to this litera-
 ture with even mild priors concerning
 the importance of, say, liquidity con-
 straints is going to go away with different
 opinions. As evidence of this, we dis-
 agree: Browning feels that, based on the
 results in Table 5.1, there is no strong
 evidence against the standard additive
 model while Lusardi believes that there
 is. Although a full "sensitivity" study on
 the PSID would be extremely useful we
 feel that it is unlikely that any really con-
 vincing evidence regarding the validity
 of the standard additive model is going
 to be found using Euler equations on
 data of the sort used in Table 5.1.
 5.3 Empirical Evidence on the
 Precautionary Saving Motive
 Given the central place that the pre-
 cautionary motive has assumed in the
 theoretical literature it is not surprising
 that there have been several recent at-
 tempts to quantify the importance of this
 motive. Some of this has taken the form
 of matching results of simulations to
 broad facts; we shall discuss this in the
 next section which deals with life-cycle
 saving. There has also been a good deal
 of work on the short-run implications of
 the precautionary motive and it is to this
 that we now turn.
 All of the recent empirical studies
 have followed the route of including
 some measure of risk either in a con-
 sumption, saving, or wealth equation or
 in an Euler equation and then testing for
 its significance. In Table 5.2 we list a
 number of studies that follow this ap-
 proach. As can be seen, a wide variety of
 left hand side variables and measures of
 risk have been used.
 The central problem that faces anyone
 who wishes to determine the role of pre-
 cautionary saving in this way is to iden-
 tify some observable and exogenous
 source of risk that varies significantly
 across the population. All three adjec-
 tives (observable, exogenous, and vari-
 able) are operative here. As regards ob-
 servability: we obviously need to observe
 either some measure of risk directly or
 some proxy for it if we are to include it
 as a "right hand side" variable. Some in-
 vestigators use measures of income vari-
 ance that are derived from observed
 income processes (see Carroll 1994; Car-
 roll and Andrew Samwick 1995a, 1995b;
 and Mark Kazarosian 1994). These are
 sensitive to assumptions about measure-
 ment error and how much the agent
 knows that the econometrician does not.
 Another approach is to proxy risk with
 the variance of consumption in an Euler
 equation (see Michael Kuehlwein 1991;
 and Karen Dynan 1993). This is prob-
 lematic if there is cross-agent variation,
 measurement error, or some durability
 in the consumption measure used in esti-
 mation. Direct measures of subjective
 measures are more attractive in this re-
 spect (see Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese
 1992, 1996; and Lusardi 1993) but they
 30So iong as we rule out models in which past
 behavior on y affects the discount factor, as in Hi-
 rofumi Uzawa (1968).
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 TABLE 5.2
 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR PRECAUTIONARY SAVING
 Left Hand Side
 Authors Data Set Variable Measure of Risk Main Finding
 ier (1988) CES Saving rate Occupation dummies No evidence of precautionary
 motive
 ulwein (1991) PSID Food consumption Variance of forecast No evidence of precautionary
 growth error of Euler motive
 equation
 , Jappelli, & SHIW Wealth and Subjective earnings Precautionary motive explains
 zzese (1992) (Italy) consumption relative variance 2% of wealth accumulation
 to permanent income
 L (1993) CES Consumption growth Variance of No evidence of precautionary
 consumption growth motive
 rdi (1993) SHIW Wealth relative to Subjective earnings Precautionary motive explains
 (Italy) permanent income variance 13% of wealth accumulation
 Th (1994) CES & PSID Consumption Income variance, All measures of risk negatively
 equivalent related to consumption
 precautionary
 premium
 D Jappelli, & SHIW Share of risky assets Subjective earnings Risk decreases the demand for
 zzese (1996) (Italy) in the portfolio variance and health risky assets
 risk
 rosian (1994) NLS Wealth relative to Income variance Doubling variance increases
 permanent income wealth/permanent income ratio
 by 29%
 oll & Samwick PSID Log wealth Income variance Strong positive relationship
 995a) between income variance and
 wealth
 oil & Samwick PSID Log wealth Income variance, Precautionary motive explains
 995b) equivalent about 40% of wealth accumulation
 precautionary
 premium
 En & Jonathan SIPP Wealth relative to Unemployment Raising the replacement ratio by
 :er (1995) permanent income insurance 10% lowers wealth by 1.4-5.6%
 replacement rate
 Tiael Palumbo Maine Workers' Saving (binary Earnings variance, Income risk increases saving
 995) Survey variable) union membership
 tha Starr-McCluer SCF Log wealth Health insurance Mixed evidence of precautionary
 996) coverage saving
 are problematic because they depend on
 the answers to questions that respon-
 dents may not understand well or may
 not have any incentive to- answer accu-
 rately.
 Sizable variability in the measure of
 risk is also important because most of
 the left hand side variables that have
 been suggested as regressors (for exam-
 ple, saving rates or wealth to permanent
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 income measures) are likely to be quite
 noisy.
 The exogeneity issue is, however, the
 most problematic. The issues can be il-
 lustrated by referring back to one of the
 (many) tests in Friedman (1957). Sup-
 pose we calculate saving rates for agents
 who are in different occupations (see, for
 example, Skinner 1988). If we can order
 occupations by the earnings risk attached
 to them, then we can check whether sav-
 ing rates are significantly higher for
 those in riskier jobs. The problem with
 this is that the agent's choice of occupa-
 tion may be correlated with attitudes to
 risk. Suppose, for instance, that risk
 aversion and prudence are positively cor-
 related across the population. Risk
 averse agents will choose less risky jobs
 but they will also be more prudent and,
 ceteris paribus, save more. Thus even if
 there is a strong precautionary motive
 for all agents we may not observe a posi-
 tive cross-section correlation between
 earnings risk and saving rates. Con-
 versely, a negative correlation between
 risk aversion and prudence will lead us to
 underestimate the precautionary motive.
 The problem here is compounded by
 the fact that earnings risk may also be
 correlated with other important aspects
 of earnings. For example, risk and the
 time path of earnings may be correlated
 (for example, flat paths may be less
 risky) so that some of the observed vari-
 ation in saving rates may be associated
 with variation due to the life-cycle mo-
 tive rather than to the precautionary mo-
 tive. Equally, the rate of return may be
 correlated with risk, One example would
 be for self-employed people. They may
 face riskier income streams but with
 much higher rates of return on invest-
 ments in their own business. Thus risk is
 negatively correlated with (expected) re-
 turn. In this case the precautionary mo-
 tive is confounded with the intertempo-
 ral substitution motive.
 To circumvent the endogeneity prob-
 lem, Friedman (1957) suggests another
 source of variation in earnings risk that
 we can take as exogenous: race. If blacks
 face higher earnings risk than whites
 then this should lead to them having
 higher saving rates. The problem here is
 that although the source of variation may
 be taken to be exogenous, preferences
 may also be correlated with race. For ex-
 ample, in equation (5.2) , and a?+, may
 both depend on race (in a linear fashion)
 so that even if a race dummy is signifi-
 cant we cannot identify whether this is
 due to differences in discount factors or
 attitudes to consumption risk.
 One possible alternative is to identify
 episodes in which certain state insurance
 schemes (such as unemployment insur-
 ance, health insurance, or old age pen-
 sions) were extended to different seg-
 ments of the population and to trace in
 the micro data the reactions to these
 changes. This has some claim to being
 exogenous; the extension of a program
 (rather than a marginal change in the
 program for current members) is likely
 to be "large" and we can observe the
 timing of such extensions quite precisely.
 It may even be that some changes were
 large enough to induce observable
 changes in the aggregate data although
 such investigations will be plagued by
 the lack of a "control" group who experi-
 enced no change.
 Yet another approach to assessing how
 important it is to allow for a precaution-
 ary motive in the empirical work would
 be to set up an exact Euler equation that
 nests the quadratic (CEQ) model as a
 special case and then to test directly for
 the significance of the extra "non-CEQ"
 parameters. This could be done using
 the method developed by Attanasio and
 Browning (1995) to derive their generali-
 zation of the CRRA model (see the dis-
 cussion in Subsection 5.1 above). If the
 non-CEQ parameters are significant for
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 different groups then this indicates a sig-
 nificant (but not necessarily large) pre-
 cautionary motive.
 Table 5.2 presents what has been
 done. The most widely used measure of
 risk is income risk. The evidence on the
 importance of this is mixed. On the one
 hand, Skinner (1988) and Guiso, Jap-
 pelli, and Terlizzese (1992) find little or
 no evidence in favor of a precautionary
 motive whereas Carroll and Samwick
 (1995a, 1995b) find that the precaution-
 ary motive explains a sizable part of
 wealth holdings. It is still difficult, how-
 ever, to assess how well income risk can
 characterize the saving and wealth distri-
 bution. For example, the studies which
 work with log wealth exclude households
 with nonpositive wealth; these represent
 a significant proportion of the popula-
 tion. Furthermore, it seems unlikely to
 us that the wealthy are significantly mo-
 tivated by their fear of future income or
 consumption shocks. As we have seen in
 Section 3, a large proportion of saving is
 due to rich households which certainly
 bounds the possible quantitative impor-
 tance of the precautionary motive due to
 income risk.
 Other types of risk may be important
 but the empirical results in Table 5.2 do
 not give a strong indication that house-
 holds that are not covered do indeed save
 more than otherwise similar households.
 As to other findings concerning, for exam-
 ple, portfolio composition, while these are
 suggestive they are not yet convincing.
 Our reading of the evidence presented
 in the papers in Table 5.2 and other
 work on saving patterns is that while the
 precautionary motive is important for
 some people at some times, it is unlikely
 to be so for most people. Thus the Car-
 roll and Samwick results suggest that the
 precautionary motive is strong for
 younger households who are not wealthy.
 The low level of consumption of young
 people who have very good lifetime pros-
 pects also seems to us to argue for a sub-
 stantial precautionary motive. On the
 other hand, we have already seen that
 wealthy households do much of the sav-
 ing and they are unlikely to be subject to
 a significant precautionary motive. Simi-
 larly households in the later stage of the
 life cycle who have accumulated assets
 for retirement also have an effective
 buffer against short-run shocks. Yet an-
 other group that are unlikely to have a
 significant precautionary motive are
 those in steady jobs which have fringe
 benefits that provide effective insurance
 against a wide range of contingencies
 (tenured university professors provides
 an obvious example). Given all of this, it
 seems to us that the precautionary mo-
 tive has some role to play in explaining
 saving behavior but it is unlikely to be as
 important as some studies suggest.
 5.4 Tests of Other Implications of the
 Standard Consumption Model
 There are also other implications of
 the standard consumption model that
 have been examined in the literature.
 We discuss three here that exemplify dif-
 ferent approaches. The first paper we
 discuss is Wilcox (1989). This paper uses
 macro data. As discussed in the introduc-
 tion, we are skeptical that much can be
 learnt from aggregate time series data
 about individual behavior but work that
 uses the timing of specific events in this
 way does seem to be of value (see also
 Alan Blinder and Deaton 1985). Wilcox
 notes that there is a difference in timing
 between announcements and implemen-
 tation of changes in Social Security bene-
 fits and looks for when consumption re-
 acts. According to the standard additive
 model all changes in consumption should
 be made on receipt of the new informa-
 tion and not on receipt of the actual
 payment. Essentially, then, Wilcox is
 proposing an orthogonality test of the
 conventional kind but one in which
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 knowledge of the exact timing of an an-
 nouncement is exploited. Using aggre-
 gate monthly data for the U.S. from 1965
 to 1985 Wilcox presents evidence that
 consumption reacts to the actual change
 in benefits and not to the announcement
 of the change. Interestingly, most of the
 effect seems to be concentrated on the
 purchases of durables in general and
 automobiles in particular. This weakens
 the suggestion that significant liquidity
 constraints are driving Wilcox's results
 because cars can be used as collateral for
 loans.
 Alessie, Michael Devereux, and Weber
 (1993) also present evidence that relies
 on the specific timing of a change in gov-
 ernment policy, in this case imposed
 credit restrictions. Specifically they use
 the abolition of credit restrictions in the
 U.K. in 1982 to test whether household
 demand for cars was affected by the
 change. If the conditions of the standard
 model without liquidity constraints hold
 then the relaxation of credit restrictions
 should have no effect. If, on the other
 hand, liquidity constraints are important
 then we will observe a change in pur-
 chasing behavior at the policy change
 date. Using a quasi-panel constructed
 from U.K. FES data from 1973 to 1986
 and National Transport Surveys for 1976
 and 1986 (to give the stocks of cars held)
 they provide Euler equation results that
 allow for nonseparabilities between cars,
 durables, and nondurables. The most im-
 portant of their findings from the formal
 model and from a more informal data
 analysis is that there is strong evidence
 that the abolition of credit controls led to
 a change in behavior in the way predicted
 by a model with liquidity constraints.
 Yet another test of one of the implica-
 tions of the standard additive model is
 given by Deaton and Christina Paxson
 (1994). They start from the observation
 that in a CEQ model, consumption
 should follow a random walk. Thus if we
 follow a group of households over time
 we should see consumption "spreading
 out." Using time series of expenditure
 surveys from Taiwan, the U.K., and the
 U.S., Deaton and Paxson document very
 striking increases in the dispersion of
 consumption over time for the same co-
 horts (their figure 4, which shows disper-
 sion against age, controlling for cohort, is
 particularly striking). They also show
 that the results are robust to plausible
 allowance for family size effects. Of
 course, this finding is consistent with al-
 most any theory of consumption if in-
 come has a unit root so this is not in any
 sense a powerful test against alternatives
 but it is surprising how well the predic-
 tions of the simple CEQ model stand up
 to this very focused scrutiny.
 We have presented brief accounts of
 these three studies to show some of the
 others ways that we can examine the
 implications of variants of the standard
 model. The method of Wilcox uses a
 divergence between announcement and
 implementation dates; the Alessie,
 Devereux, and Weber paper uses the
 timing of a policy change that removed a
 particular restriction in an important
 market and the Deaton and Paxson pa-
 per examines the implications for cohort
 inequality. All three papers cleverly ex-
 ploit very different implications, each of
 which deserves further investigation but
 they also suggest that there may be other
 unexploited implications that are worth
 examining. Our feeling is that this style
 of investigation is likely to lead to more
 convincing and robust results than, say,
 further Euler equation estimates on the
 PSID.
 6. Empirical Evidence on Life-Cycle
 Saving
 6.1 Life-Cycle Saving Behavior
 As stated in Section 2, we identify the
 standard model with the proposition that
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 agents seek to keep the marginal utility
 of expenditure constant from period to
 period. The Euler equations given in the
 previous section exploit this and the con-
 ditions for the standard additive model
 to examine short-run behavior but we
 can also consider long-run behavior.
 Broadly, agents should save so that con-
 sumption in retirement gives the same
 marginal utility as consumption earlier in
 the life cycle (with due allowance for any
 discounting). Note that this does not im-
 ply that consumption levels should be
 smoothed over time; fairly obviously
 households may "rationally" plan to
 spend more when there are children pre-
 sent and less when they are not working
 in the market (that is, after retirement).
 Additionally, declining health or vigor in
 older age may lead to planned (or antici-
 pated) falls in consumption over the life
 cycle.
 Because we do not have very long pan-
 els we cannot follow the same individuals
 from school to retirement and beyond.
 Thus we have to make auxiliary assump-
 tions about the constancy of certain be-
 havior over time or over the life cycle to
 examine longer run behavior. This typi-
 cally makes an explicit comparison of
 marginal utilities across time impossible.
 Consequently we have to resort to more
 informal methods.
 The simplest method of all to look at
 life-cycle behavior is to take one cross-
 section and graph means of consumption
 against age. This is the method adopted
 by, for example, Carroll and Summers
 (1991; see also Carroll 1993). Carroll and
 Summers graph a number of "life-cycle"
 consumption profiles (strictly graphs of
 consumption against age) for different
 education and occupation groups from
 the U.S. CES for 1960/61 and 1972/73.
 The most important finding in the Car-
 roll and Summers paper is that for all
 education and occupation groups, the
 shape of the income and consumption
 paths are very similar; they refer to this
 as the "consumption/income parallel."
 Note that this "fact" does not assert that
 consumption and income are equal in
 the early life cycle (the 10% saving rate
 for 25-34 year olds given in Table 3.2
 rules that out) but that they are trending
 in the same way.31
 This tracking is inconsistent with a
 CEQ model, particularly for high educa-
 tion agents who have a (predictably) ris-
 ing income profile. The coincidence be-
 tween income and consumption in the
 early part of the life cycle is not, how-
 ever, necessarily inconsistent with a stan-
 dard model that allows a precautionary
 motive; see the remarks toward the end
 of Section 2.3 above.
 It is important to emphasize that the
 graphs in Carroll and Summers (1991)
 do not follow the same agent over time.
 Thus they confound age and cohort ef-
 fects. Moreover, education has an impor-
 tant cohort component which further
 complicates drawing inferences. There
 may also be selection effects when
 groups are defined on the basis of occu-
 pation which is clearly not fixed for any
 individual. Most importantly, Carroll and
 Summers do not control for other life cy-
 cle events that affect consumption and
 saving. Once we take such events into ac-
 count it is not even clear that the evi-
 dence Carroll and Summers present is
 inconsistent with a simple CEQ model.
 Attanasio and Browning (1995) pre-
 sent graphs that are similar to those of
 Carroll and Summers. The main differ-
 ence is that Attanasio and Browning use
 several years of U.K. FES data to follow
 cohorts through time. They reproduce
 31 Note as well, that Donald Haurin, Susan
 Wachter, and Hendershott (1995) provide evi-
 dence from the NLS-Y that nonhousing wealth in-
 creases sharply in the early years of marriage as
 newly weds save for a house. This would show up
 as saving but disappear once the house is bought if
 "consumption" includes both mortgage principal
 payments as well as interest payments.
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 the finding that consumption and income
 move together over the life cycle. When
 they allow for demographics, however,
 all of the life-cycle variation in consump-
 tion disappears. Specifically, deflating
 consumption by plausible adult equiva-
 lence scales leads to a completely flat life
 cycle path for adjusted consumption (see
 also Blundell, Browning, and Meghir
 1994). At a minimum, this suggests that
 the finding that consumption and income
 move together over the life cycle may
 have other explanations than that current
 income is "causing" current consump-
 tion. Of course, the demographics "ex-
 planation" of the life-cycle path of con-
 sumption still does not explain why
 unadjusted consumption is correlated
 with income. As discussed in Browning
 (1992) we believe it is extremely unwise
 to focus on two life cycle paths (income
 and consumption in this case) and make
 inferences about causality without con-
 sidering other choices such as education;
 human capital formation; career choice;
 marriage; family composition; and labor
 supply. This is not to say that the life-
 cycle facts are consistent with a simple
 CEQ model but rather to suggest cau-
 tion in drawing inferences concerning
 the validity of a particular variant of the
 life-cycle model from two life cycle
 paths.
 In simulations of lifetime consumption
 paths, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
 (1994a, 1994b, and 1995) consider three
 sets of facts concerning wealth, saving,
 and consumption in the U.S. These are
 the typical ratio of assets to income in
 the population at any time, the age pat-
 terns of wealth and saving, and the short-
 run (five year) comovements of income
 and consumption. They employ a no be-
 quest non-CEQ model with moderate
 discount rates and liquidity constraints.
 They find that this model can better fit
 the facts on these three issues than a
 CEQ model with liquidity constraints or
 what they interpret as a buffer stock
 model. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
 (1994a) also estimate standard Euler
 equations on their simulated data and
 find results for excess sensitivity that are
 very close to those of Campbell and
 Mankiw (1990) on the aggregate data
 and Lusardi (1996) on the micro data (a
 coefficient for expected income growth
 of 0.4). Because these authors allow for
 both liquidity constraints and precau-
 tionary saving in these simulations it is
 not possible to identify which is the most
 important departure from the CEQ
 model.
 This style of empirical work in which
 simulations are used to fit some features
 of the data is halfway to full dynamic
 structural modeling. Thus the three
 Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes papers
 use dynamic programming techniques to
 simulate paths for agents in realistic set-
 tings. However, rather than estimating
 the parameters of the utility function
 they fix them and then use informal
 goodness of fit measures (literally com-
 paring columns of predicted and actual)
 to evaluate different configurations of
 the parameters. Consider, for example,
 the discount factor. Only three values
 are considered (1.5% and 3% for the
 "benchmark" models and 10% for the
 buffer stock model) and these are taken
 to be fixed within education groups (al-
 though allowance is made for the uncer-
 tainty of life so that there is effective
 higher discounting in old age). It would
 be highly desirable to allow for more
 heterogeneity in 'the parameters of the
 model and to allow that these may be
 correlated with, for example, the
 "choice" of income processes that agents
 make (see the remarks at the end of Sec-
 tion 2.3 concerning the simulations of
 Carroll and Attanasio et al.). However,
 because the present methods use vast
 amounts of computer time it is perhaps
 overly ambitious to suggest full struc-
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 tural modeling but it is the obvious next
 step.
 6.2 Saving For and In Retirement
 In the original life cycle model of
 Modigliani and others, saving for retire-
 ment played a particularly important
 role. It is thus appropriate to consider
 explicitly saving for retirement and sav-
 ing in retirement. We focus attention on
 three main questions: do younger people
 save enough for retirement? Do govern-
 ment incentives to increase saving for re-
 tirement actually increase saving? Do
 the elderly dissave? The latter not only
 has intrinsic interest but it is also impor-
 tant since all standard consumption mod-
 els predict that eventually households
 will start to dissave whether or not there
 is a bequest motive or uncertain lifetime
 (see, for example, Hurd 1990). Thus this
 prediction can be considered a "critical
 experiment" for the life-cycle model in
 its most general form.
 We start with the issue of whether
 agents save enough for their retirement
 period. There are at least three problems
 here. The first is, how do we define
 "enough." In a standard model this de-
 pends on preference parameters and the
 real rate of interest. If the discount fac-
 tor is higher than the real rate of interest
 (as is often assumed in, for example,
 buffer stock models) then agents may
 "rationally" plan to have low consump-
 tion in later life. For example, an agent
 with a log consumption utility function
 who has a discount factor that is two per-
 centage points above the real rate will
 plan to have consumption that is twice as
 high at 35 as at 70. This implies that if
 there is a good deal of heterogeneity in
 discount factors then we may observe
 many agents in the population arriving at
 retirement with low or negative assets.
 Furthermore, if there is uncertainty but
 there are also some safety nets or some
 public provisions which are asset-tested,
 then holding little or no assets can even
 be an optimal strategy.
 The second issue is: "enough" for
 whom? Browning (1994) documents that
 for the "average" married couple the
 wife is typically younger than her hus-
 band and will typically survive to a
 greater age. Combining these two factors
 he finds that a wife can expect to live
 about 50 percent longer in the retire-
 ment period than her husband. Thus
 husband and wife may have very differ-
 ent views about what is enough for re-
 tirement unless they are perfectly in
 sympathy.32 This simple observation has
 wide-ranging implications. For example,
 the level of saving by a household de-
 pends not only on the level of household
 income but also on the distribution of in-
 come within the household. This in turn
 means that for some distributions the
 marginal propensity to save is not de-
 fined: it can be anything between zero
 and unity depending on who receives the
 extra income (wives having the higher
 marginal propensity to save). Similarly,
 the age distribution within the household
 also affects the level of saving and we
 can no longer talk of the "age of the
 household" but only of the ages of its
 members.
 The third issue is how do we measure
 savings that are made for retirement?
 There are definitional and measurement
 problems. On the definitional question:
 as discussed in Section 2, once we move
 away from a CEQ model it is not clear
 what the sum of current assets and the
 expected flow of future funds represents.
 Thus it is problematic to aggregate liquid
 32 This is part of a much larger literature that is
 emerging on intrahousehold allocation. One as yet
 uninvestigated area that may be of signal impor-
 tance for savings behavior is the effect of possible
 family dissolution. If we introduce the possibility
 of divorce into our life cycle models then this may
 undermine many of the predictions that we cur-
 rently derive from "unitary" (single utility func-
 tion) models of the household.
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 assets and housing wealth, future Social
 Security pension receipts, and entitle-
 ments to free medical care after retire-
 ment. Even the usefulness of the sum of
 current assets in tax sheltered instru-
 ments and other financial assets depends
 on the context. For example, Eric Engen
 and Gale (1993) show that the early
 withdrawal penalty on Individual Retire-
 ment Accounts (IRA's) provides a
 theoretical justification for IRA saving
 and non-IRA saving to be imperfect sub-
 stitutes for those some time away from
 retirement.
 As well as the question of how we ag-
 gregate different assets is the question of
 how we can measure them. The new
 Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
 and the Survey of Asset and Health
 Dynamics Among the Oldest Old
 (AHEAD) incorporate new survey tech-
 niques that result in substantially smaller
 biases resulting from missing wealth
 components. One of the striking findings
 is that household wealth holdings re-
 ported in these data set are substantially
 higher than the figures reported in other
 surveys, which suggests that wealth gen-
 erally tends to be underreported (see
 Thomas Juster and J. Smith 1994).
 With these considerations in mind, we
 start examining some of the evidence
 provided in the papers that examine this
 issue. Direct evidence on the adequacy
 of retirement saving is provided by
 Daniel Hamermesh (1984). He con-
 cludes that for couples, consumption
 early in retirement exceeds by 14 per-
 cent the income that their financial, pen-
 sion, and Social Security wealth can gen-
 erate. He finds that they respond to this
 insufficiency by reducing their consump-
 tion as they age. This finding, however,
 is dependent on the imputation method
 that Hamermesh uses for total consump-
 tion and is also at odds with the evidence
 presented earlier which suggests that
 saving is typically positive for households
 just after the conventional retirement
 age (see, for example, Table 3.3). James
 Banks, Blundell, and Sarah Tanner
 (1995) also examine consumption pat-
 terns directly and conclude that while
 some of the fall in consumption after re-
 tirement can be rationalized within a
 standard model that allows for comple-
 mentaries between consumption and la-
 bor supply, there is still an additional
 "unexplained" fall in consumption.
 A number of studies have documented
 the very great heterogeneity in wealth
 levels at retirement (see Peter Diamond
 and Jerry Hausman 1984; Venti and
 David Wise 1993; and Gustman and
 Juster 1995). Very many households en-
 ter retirement with very little in the way
 of financial assets and not very much in
 wider definitions of wealth that include
 housing equity. On the other hand, some
 households have high levels of wealth
 that can obviously finance high post-re-
 tirement consumption levels or bequests.
 Another consistent feature of estimates
 of wealth holdings is how these vary
 across family types (see, for example,
 Kennickell and Shack-Marquez 1992; the
 U. S. Congressional Budget Office 1993;
 and J. Smith 1994). Typically, married
 couples have the highest levels of wealth
 and lone parents the lowest with singles
 in between (but with quite low levels of
 wealth). This mirrors the pattern for sav-
 ing given in Section 3. Finally, wealth
 levels at retirement seem to be highly
 correlated with education levels: low lev-
 els of wealth are found for those with the
 lowest level of education.
 In a series of papers, Bernheim (1993,
 1994a, 1994b) has examined the ade-
 quacy of accumulation by "baby boom-
 ers" (those born between 1946 and 1964)
 to provide for retirement. According to
 his calculations, the typical baby boomer
 is saving at one-third the rate required to
 finance a standard of living during retire-
 ment comparable to the standard of liv-
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 ing that it enjoys before retirement.33 He
 argues that the parents of the baby
 boomers also decreased their saving with
 respect to previous generations but they
 benefited from a series of fortuitous de-
 velopments which will not be available to
 baby boomers. For example, real social
 security benefits increased dramatically
 during the 1970s and private retirement
 benefits were significantly expanded and
 improved during the same period. Addi-
 tionally, they (the parents) experienced a
 period of high inflation that wiped out
 much of their liabilities and finally they
 enjoyed a sharp increase in the relative
 price of housing which created big wind-
 fall gains. If baby boomers rely on what
 their parents have saved, they may be
 misguided in their judgments. According
 to Bernheim, baby boomers are not only
 financially vulnerable but they may not
 even perceive correctly their vulnerabil-
 ity.
 A study from the U. S. Congressional
 Budget Office (1993) on this issue came
 out with somewhat different conclusions.
 While some of this study's findings agree
 with Bernheim (for example, the less
 educated are making less provision for
 retirement) there are critical differences
 which derive from the measure of wealth
 chosen to evaluate the adequacy of accu-
 mulation. Whether or not one includes
 the value of housing equity in counting
 the assets available for consumption at
 retirement makes a big difference. From
 the CBO study, assuming that housing
 wealth will not be used to finance retire-
 ment reduces available resources by a
 factor of three at the median. Home
 ownership was an important factor in the
 accumulation of wealth in the 1980s.
 Young households who are homeowners
 show a relatively higher wealth-to-in-
 come ratio in 1989 than in 1962 and
 those who do not own their homes show
 similar or lower wealth to income ratios.
 The CBO study expresses concern that
 the nonhomeowners may be unable to
 accumulate wealth at a rate that is suffi-
 cient to give them a comfortable life in
 retirement.
 It is clear that the house is an impor-
 tant asset in the household portfolio.
 Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992),
 for example, report that the principal
 residence accounts for 32.2 percent of
 the assets of the household sector in
 1989. However, one can argue whether
 housing wealth provides a good vehicle
 for consumption at retirement. In a pair
 of studies Venti and Wise (1989, 1990)
 show that there is little decumulation of
 housing equities and what decumulation
 there is, is observed only very late in age.
 Sally Merrill (1984) finds that the elderly
 with few liquid assets or low income are
 no more likely to trade down their hous-
 ing equity than other elderly. On the
 other hand, Louise Sheiner and Weil
 (1992) find some evidence that house-
 holds reduce home ownership as they
 age, even though they estimate that 42
 percent of households will leave behind
 a house when the last member dies.
 Even though reverse annuity mortgages
 are now available, there seem to be little
 use of them (see Venti and Wise 1991).
 Thus it seems that a substantial frac-
 tion of U.S. households will depend on
 Social Security for support in retirement.
 As against this, a substantial minority of
 households are now holding assets in tar-
 geted retirement saving accounts. This is
 the second issue that we examine: the ef-
 fect on saving of schemes such as IRA's
 and 401k's. These are schemes which
 raise the rate of return on saving for re-
 33This "one third" estimate should be treated
 with caution: it refers to nonpension saving. Thus
 if the optimal level of post-retirement consump-
 tion is to be financed from Social Security, an oc-
 cupational pension, and private saving an the la -
 ter provides, say, 30% of the income to do this,
 then the "one third" refers to the latter and post-
 retirement consumption will be only 20% below
 the optimal level.
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 tirement by allowing contributions to be
 made out of gross income and also ex-
 empt income from the assets purchased
 from tax.34 The theoretical impact of the
 introduction of such schemes on aggre-
 gate saving is ambiguous. There may be
 a positive effect for current nonsavers
 some of whom may now be induced to
 save by the higher return. However, this
 positive increment may be offset by the
 behavior of current savers. For them, the
 introduction of such a scheme has the
 usual negative income effect and positive
 substitution effect; the net effect is am-
 biguous. Thus we must have recourse to
 the data to sign the aggregate effect.
 We do not have the space here to do
 justice to the literature on saving incen-
 tives; see Poterba, Venti, and Wise
 (1993, 1994), Engen, Gale, and Scholz
 (1994), and Gale and Scholz (1994b) for
 different views of this controversy and
 Hubbard and Skinner (1995) for a thor-
 ough and balanced review. The impor-
 tant point is that empirical work in this
 area confronts a serious identification
 problem. Although there is widespread
 agreement that in any cross-section there
 is a positive correlation between wealth
 and- participation in "targeted" saving
 schemes there is no consensus about the
 inference that can be drawn from this.
 The positive correlation is consistent
 with the existence of heterogeneity in
 "tastes for saving" (or discount rates) and
 with substitution effects (including the
 entry of new savers) overcoming income
 effects. Different authors have adopted
 different approaches to identification
 but none of these command universal
 agreement. In their review of the evi-
 dence, Hubbard and Skinner (1995) con-
 clude that there is some short run impact
 on net saving and even larger long run
 effects.
 The other question we began with is
 whether the elderly dissave. In the sim-
 plest life cycle model with no bequests
 and no uncertainty about the life span,
 decumulation should begin at retire-
 ment. Introducing uncertain lifetime and
 a bequest may push back the age at
 which saving becomes negative but it
 does not invalidate the prediction that
 the elderly will eventually start to dis-
 save. Although this area could bear more
 theoretical investigation35 this does seem
 to be one of the robust predictions of the
 life-cycle model because it is difficult to
 believe that liquidity constraints are im-
 portant in later life and earnings risk is
 unimportant.
 This issue has been widely investi-
 gated and in fact it represented the first
 attack on the simple life cycle model
 (see the review provided in Hurd 1990).
 We have seen that the wealth accumu-
 lated in housing equity shows little ten-
 dency to decline. Do other types of
 wealth show any decumulation? The
 critical point to note here is that to cor-
 rectly establish whether the elderly
 decumulate we need to have panel data.
 We cannot simply compare wealth
 holdings or saving of different age
 groups. The evidence from cross-sec-
 tional data (see, for example, Table 3.3)
 confounds age and cohort effects (see
 Anthony Shorrocks 1975). An alternative
 34IRA's became available in 1982 and reached
 their greatest popularity in the year before the Tax
 Reform Act of 1986. Holdings of such accounts are
 currently estimated at about $10 billion. 401k
 plans were created by 1978 legislation and became
 widely available in the early 1980s. Between 1983
 and 1990, the number of participants in 401k
 plans rose from 4.4 to 20.8 million. Personal re-
 tirement assets increased over fourfold between
 1984 and 1991, much more than any other compo-
 nent of wealth (see Poterba, Venti, and Wise
 1994).
 35For example, we believe that an additional
 area that merits further theoretical investigation is
 the consequences of illness or a diminished "zest
 for life" which tends to "kink" the marginal utility
 of money and reduce the desirability of current
 consumption as against bequests (see Axel Borsch-
 Supan and Konrad Stahl 1991; and B6rsch-Supan
 1992).
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 is to follow the same cohort through a
 series of cross-sections, a technique
 which has proven useful for pre-retire-
 ment households. For the elderly, how-
 ever, this suffers from the fact that mor-
 tality is negatively correlated with wealth
 and that the poor are more likely to live
 with their children or enter nursing
 homes (which means that they would
 drop out from the sample or be part of
 other households). This introduces a bias
 in the cohort average over time because
 the older the cohort the higher the pro-
 portion of those who had high wealth at
 retirement. We have also to be careful
 about family composition because the
 decumulation of couples can be lower
 than singles given that the expected
 "lifetime" of the household is greater for
 couples.
 In panel data, however, we can handle
 these problems by considering only a
 sample of households who survive to a
 late age and following their asset levels
 through time. Using this technique,
 Hurd (1990) presents evidence of decu-
 mulation in later old age.36 Although this
 finding provides comfort for advocates of
 life-cycle models it does little to settle
 whether, for example, liquidity con-
 straints are important for younger peo-
 ple. Thus if this finding turns out to be
 robust then it provides evidence in favor
 of using the standard model in general
 but not of which variant (CEQ or non-
 CEQ, with or without habits and liquid-
 ity constraints). There are many investi-
 gators, however, who feel that the
 life-cycle framework itself is too restric-
 tive and that other ways of looking at be-
 havior provide a better understanding of
 saving behavior. In the next section we
 present some of the relatively new work
 that uses a "behavioral" framework.
 7. Nonstandard Models
 Johnny Hodges played with the Duke
 Ellington band for over 30 years. During
 all that time Ellington paid Hodges
 daily; the reason for this was that if he
 paid him weekly then Hodges would go
 hungry for six days of the week. Evi-
 dently Hodges had a considerable prob-
 lem with self-control. Recent behavioral
 models of saving have posited that most
 people have a self-control problem and
 that this invalidates straightforward ap-
 plication of a standard life cycle model
 (see Thaler 1990, 1994; and David Laib-
 son 1994).
 A second feature of the lifetime alloca-
 tion problem that behavioral economists
 emphasize is the complexity of the dy-
 namic optimization problem that agents
 face (see, for example, Bernheim 1993).
 This may be overcome if the problem is
 one that many people face and where
 outcomes are revealed in a relatively
 short time because then agents can ob-
 serve others and "rules of thumb" may
 be developed. At a minimum, glaring
 mistakes can be avoided. This route is
 not available for people aged, say, 40 in
 1994 who are thinking about saving for
 retirement. The demographic composi-
 tion of the population, the level of devel-
 opment of the economy and of support
 for the currently old has changed so
 much in the past 30 years that looking at
 what their parents, for example, did is
 likely to be a very poor guide. Against
 this, we might remark that the size of
 er ors that Bernheim (1993) suggests
 some people are making could be
 avoided by fairly crude programs if these
 agents were indeed interested in saving
 as much as Bernheim suggests they
 should: we do not need the exact solu-
 tion, only a good one. The point remains,
 however, that we can question whether
 the assumption of unbounded computa-
 tional abilities used in our model of eco-
 36 Decumulation is, of course, only a necessary
 condition for the standard model and not suffi-
 cient; we must also take account of the rate of
 decumulation.
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 nomic decision making is viable. Thaler
 (1994), for example, advocates models of
 bounded rationality as a better charac-
 terization of individual behavior.
 The third putative failing of the stan-
 dard framework is the assumption of
 fungibility. The marginal propensity to
 spend out of different sources of wealth
 (increases in housing equity due to in-
 creases in house prices, changes in fu-
 ture pension rights, etc.) is not the same.
 Behavioral economists posit that indi-
 viduals create "mental accounts" for
 their different assets causing their mar-
 ginal propensity to consume from those
 assets to vary with the level of tempta-
 tion associated with each one. Thaler
 suggests that this non-substitutability is
 not consistent with a life-cycle model.
 The imputation of this implication to the
 standard framework seems to follow
 from an identification of the latter with
 the CEQ model. As we have seen, it is by
 no means a prediction of the model with-
 out certainty equivalence that agents will
 treat all sources of expected income and
 wealth identically. In particular, the ex-
 istence of a precautionary saving motive
 breaks the perfect substitutability of as-
 sets. Another example is when there ex-
 ists liquidity constraints. If consumers
 cannot borrow against some of their as-
 sets, we would observe that less liquid
 assets have a lower marginal propensity
 to consume.
 It is instructive to consider in more
 detail one typical example cited by be-
 havioral economists: the case of Christ-
 mas clubs. Such a club requires a fixed
 weekly payment throughout the year and
 then pays out the amount saved at the
 end of the year. The existence of such
 clubs poses a problem for standard mod-
 els because the rate of return is usually
 low (because administration costs are
 high) and agents are "locked" in during
 the year. Thus a Christmas club provides
 a lower return and less flexibility than a
 conventional saving account. Two salient
 features of the Christmas club example
 seem important to us. First, the con-
 sumption path that agents actually
 achieve (lower consumption during the
 year and higher consumption at the end
 of the year) is the same path that a for-
 ward looking agent with no self-control
 problems would achieve by saving in a
 bank. Put another way, Ellington and
 Hodges did manage to find some mecha-
 nism that ensured that Hodges ate every
 day. Thus the predictions of the standard
 model for consumption paths would be
 essentially correct. On the other hand,
 the predictions of the standard model for
 portfolio behavior are wholly unable to
 account for the specific asset position
 taken. It is our belief that this applies
 more generally: if the standard model
 (with or without liquidity constraints)
 fails in the direction of agents not exer-
 cising self-control it is likely to be in pre-
 dictions of portfolio behavior and not the
 actual consumption paths realized.
 More effort is required of both behav-
 ioral economists and economists who use
 the standard life cycle framework to
 achieve more understanding. Thus pro-
 tagonists of the standard framework
 (among whom the first coauthor includes
 himself) would ask: what specific fea-
 tures of the data that are regularly used
 (the PSID or quasi-panels, for example)
 are better rationalized within a behav-
 ioral framework rather than a standard
 framework? On the other hand, advo-
 cates of a behavioral position can reason-
 ably ask: can the "anomalies" that they
 identify really be rationalized within a
 life-cycle framework? We emphasize
 here that we should not tie our hands
 behind our backs and use only a CEQ
 model with limited heterogeneity (in
 tastes and environment). The remark by
 Thaler (1994) that in the standard life
 cycle framework "the only policy variable
 [to increase the U.S. saving rate] is the
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 after-tax rate of return" ignores the
 theoretical developments of the past ten
 years.
 To take another example of possible
 cross-fertilization, consider the source of
 preferences. Many users of the standard
 model are willing to allow that there are
 differences between cohorts in attitudes
 to saving. The inclusion of cohort "dum-
 mies" in a consumption or saving equa-
 tion, however, is really an admission of
 ignorance. Bernheim's suggestion that
 attitudes to saving are partly determined
 by the environment in which people
 grow up is surely correct but not much
 more useful than including cohort dum-
 mies. The modeling of cohort effects
 would gain from a more precise specifi-
 cation of exactly how the environment
 matters so that we could predict, for ex-
 ample, whether people coming to matur-
 ity now have attitudes that are closer to
 those born in the early part of the cen-
 tury than they are to those born in the
 late 1940s. Along this line, Arie Kapteyn,
 Alessie, and Lusardi (1995) present re-
 sults that suggest that we can replace co-
 hort dummies in a saving equation by the
 level of per capita income in the year in
 which the head of the household was 22.
 As an illustration of the progressive
 strategy of seeking for features of the
 data that are inconsistent with one view
 or the other, we quote Bernheim (1994b,
 p. 69) who uses the fact that non-college
 graduates save very little to argue that
 general economic literacy is an impor-
 tant determinant of saving behavior. Ac-
 cording to him,
 patterns of wealth accumulation among those
 without a college degree bear little or no re-
 semblance to the pattern that should emerge
 from sophisticated decision making. In con-
 trast, those with college degrees not only save
 more adequately for retirement, but also gen-
 erally behave in a way that more closely re-
 sembles the outcome of sophisticated plan-
 ning.
 Implicitly, then, this seems to be an ar-
 gument against using the standard
 framework for less educated agents.
 Within the standard framework, how-
 ever, one explanation for this observation
 would be that there is heterogeneity in
 discount factors and this leads some
 agents to choose less schooling and less
 consumption in later life (relative to
 their earlier life) than their better edu-
 cated contemporaries.
 Thaler (1994) suggests that allowing
 that some people have a high discount
 rate "renders the theory empty" which is
 a position we agree with if we are look-
 ing at just one narrow aspect of behavior.
 What gives the standard life cycle frame-
 work real bite is that we must account
 for a whole range of behavior (short- and
 long-run saving, schooling, and occupa-
 tion choice, fertility choice, portfolio de-
 cisions, retirement decisions, etc.) with
 the same set of parameters. Therefore
 the same parameters should explain the
 saving behavior at different stages of the
 life cycle, the wide heterogeneity of
 wealth across households, and the rea-
 sons why aggregate saving rates change
 over time, to mention just a few of the
 facts that we have considered in this sur-
 vey. This is an ambitious undertaking
 which we have hardly yet begun, much
 less tried and discarded.
 8. Conclusions
 We began this survey with a list of mo-
 tives for saving. This list seems complete
 and sensible; a satisfactory theory of con-
 sumption and saving should encompass
 most of these motives. Our discussion of
 the standard optimizing framework in
 Section 2 indicates that this "model" can
 do this. Thus the CEQ model allows for
 the life-cycle, intertemporal substitution,
 and bequest motives. The more general
 standard additive model adds in the pre-
 cautionary motive which has been the fo-
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 cus of much of the theoretical work of
 the past decade. Finally, dropping the
 "additive" assumptions we can incorpo-
 rate habits and imperfections in the capi-
 tal market. Thus the standard model pro-
 vides a powerful and flexible framework
 for organizing our thoughts. If the stan-
 dard model ultimately fails to adequately
 explain the facts then it is not because a
 more sophisticated version is required
 but because it is the wrong way to think
 about household decisions on consump-
 tion and saving.
 As to the facts themselves, we have a
 variety of data sets that provide us with
 information on household saving. In Sec-
 tions 3, 4.1, and 6 we presented some
 facts about saving behavior. While these
 data provide a more or less accurate de-
 scription of who saves and how this has
 changed over time, they are much less
 effective in helping us to answer the ba-
 sic question of why people save.
 If we accept that the very intensive ef-
 fort to identify the importance of differ-
 ent motives for saving using currently
 available data sets has not led to much
 consensus, then it seems that the road to
 robust identification lies in collecting
 more and "better" data. Specifically we
 need data that are directly informed by
 the theory to produce more focused
 sample design. To take one example,
 consider the debate concerning the sav-
 ing behavior of the elderly. To assess
 whether behavior is consistent with the
 theory we need information on, for ex-
 ample, health status, subjective percep-
 tions of mortality risk, and the situation
 of any children. This requires the devel-
 opment of new questions to elicit these
 variables. This is one of the avowed in-
 tentions of the AHEAD and HRS sur-
 veys listed in Table 3.1.
 As another example, consider the
 question of the relative importance of
 the precautionary motive and liquidity
 constraints in explaining consumption
 growth. Referring back to equation (2.8)
 we see that the two terms for these (the
 variance term, aF+1 and the Lagrange
 multiplier, vt respectively) are both un-
 observable. As we discussed at length in
 Section 5, it has turned out to be diffi-
 cult to separate these two effects. Given
 the effort that has gone into doing this
 on currently available data sets it seems
 likely that some new survey questions
 that identify observable exogenous corre-
 lates for the variance term and for the
 liquidity constraint Lagrange multiplier
 are needed. Questions such as those in
 the SCF that relate to being refused
 credit represent a step in that direction.
 As we emphasized in the theory sec-
 tion, one of the great virtues of the stan-
 dard model is that it integrates short-run
 and long-run consumption decisions in a
 coherent way. Thus the parameters that
 enter the Euler equation for the deter-
 mination of consumption changes from
 period to period are the same as those
 that govern the allocation of resources
 between the present and the distant fu-
 ture. Ideally we should estimate jointly
 Euler equations and long-run (levels)
 consumption functions to parameterize
 our standard models. This seems to be
 analytically and computationally infeasi-
 ble at present. A promising intermediate
 step is simulation models with parame-
 ters chosen either by taking values from
 other studies (for example, Hubbard,
 Skinner, and Zeldes 1995) or from Euler
 equation estimates (for example, At-
 tanasio et al. 1995).
 Although simulation models face diffi-
 culties such as the sensitivity of out-
 comes to terminal conditions and the
 need to keep the number of specific in-
 stitutional and demographic factors small
 to economize on computing needs, this
 seems the immediate way forward. One
 relatively unexplored area here is the im-
 portance of heterogeneity across the
 population in explaining cross-section
This content downloaded from 129.170.194.173 on Thu, 21 Jun 2018 17:58:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1850 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIV (December 1996)
 variation. Some of this heterogeneity is
 usually observed (for example, the num-
 ber of children in the household); some
 is rarely or never measured but is poten-
 tially observable (for example, expecta-
 tions concerning inheritances) and some
 is potentially very difficult to measure
 (for example, how risk averse or prudent
 the agent is). At present we allow for the
 former two in simulations by giving
 households exogenous paths for these
 variables. For unobservable heterogene-
 ity, it would be useful to allow for ran-
 dom (but perhaps correlated) heteroge-
 neity in, for example, the parameters
 governing the discount rate, intertempo-
 ral substitution and prudence37 in our
 simulations. It is an open question as to
 how much of the data can be "explained"
 just with heterogeneity of this sort.
 More ambitiously, it is desirable in fu-
 ture to integrate a whole range of life-cy-
 cle decisions such as marriage and fertil-
 ity decisions, education and career
 choice, and intergenerational transfers.
 In all of this modeling, standard dynamic
 programming techniques can be bought
 to bear for these simulations because
 they derive from the standard optimizing
 model. What of nonstandard models?
 At present, the only coherent alterna-
 tives to the standard model are behav-
 ioral models. These have the great virtue
 of putting saving at center stage whereas
 the standard model reduces saving to a
 residual between income and the con-
 sumption that is determined within the
 model. They also emphasize elements of
 behavior (such as self-control and limits
 on computational power) which seem
 important intuitively. On the other hand,
 it is not clear that these models lead to
 sharp predictions that can be tested on
 the data sets so widely used to test vari-
 ous versions of the standard model. One
 immediate next step would be to explore
 how far we can reconcile behavioral
 models and standard optimizing predic-
 tions. More ambitiously, it may be that
 the heterogeneity that we allow for in
 standard models can be linked to psycho-
 logical factors. This will allow parsimoni-
 ous modeling of heterogeneity and may
 provide a link across many different life
 cycle decisions.
 Above we have reviewed a great deal
 of high quality research on the theory
 and evidence concerning the saving be-
 havior of households. Although substan-
 tial progress has been made in the past
 15 years, more problems remain than
 have been satisfactorily answered. The
 broadest of these questions is whether
 the standard theory is of much use in un-
 derstanding saving behavior. If it is, then
 we can expect rapid progress in under-
 standing as new and better data becomes
 available. The combination of a rich and
 flexible theoretical framework, good
 data, and appropriate econometric tech-
 niques promises much: we look forward
 to seeing the new results.
 37 Such a three parameter -model would, of
 course, require something other than the usual
 iso-elastic utility function.
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